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Article
Aggregating Probabilities Across Cases:
Criminal Responsibility for Unspecified
Offenses
Alon Harel and Ariel Poratt
INTRODUCTION
Should a court convict a defendant for an unspecified of-
fense if there is no reasonable doubt that he committed an of-
fense, even though the prosecution cannot prove his guilt as to
a particular offense beyond a reasonable doubt? Stated other-
wise, is committing an offense sufficient for a conviction or
must a prosecutor establish what this offense is to justify a
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conviction? This Article contends that, under certain condi-
tions, a prosecutor should not have to establish the particular
offense committed by a defendant-proof that the defendant
committed an offense should be sufficient.
Two distinct methods exist by which judges and juries
could evaluate whether the standard of "beyond a reasonable
doubt" is satisfied in cases where a defendant is charged with
several offenses. Under the traditional "distinct probabilities
principle" (DPP), when a defendant is charged with a number
of offenses, the court examines each charge individually to de-
cide whether the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is satis-
fied with regard to each charge. Alternatively, the court could
use the "aggregate probabilities principle" (APP) to examine all
charges in aggregate and decide whether the standard is satis-
fied with respect to at least one charge.' Example 1 illustrates
how the APP would work.
Example 1: A person is charged with pickpocketing
and rape, two unrelated offenses allegedly committed
by him at different times and places. The evidence
suggests that the probability that he committed each
one of these offenses is .9. Assume that the required
probability necessary to satisfy the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard is .95.2 Should the court
convict the defendant on either of the offenses?
Weighed separately-that is, applying the DPP-the de-
fendant in Example 1 will likely be acquitted of both offenses.
Yet, there is a .99 probability3 that he committed at least one
offense, which is higher than the .95 probability necessary for
conviction in a criminal trial. Alternatively, the APP would
convict him of one unspecified offense and impose on him at
1. Cf. Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV.
723, 729 (2001) (noting the absence of an aggregate-probabilities approach in
criminal law, according to which probabilities are aggregated across the differ-
ent elements of the same offense). Levmore does not raise, however, the ques-
tion of aggregating probabilities across different cases, which this Article ad-
dresses. Cf. id.
2. This Article uses numerical probabilities for the sake of exposition.
See infra notes 6, 17 and accompanying text.
3. The probability that the defendant committed each one of the offenses
is .9, and therefore the probability, for each one, that he did not commit the
offense is 1 - .9 = .1. Consequently, the probability that he did not commit any
offense is (.1)2 = .01, and the probability that he committed at least one of the
offenses is 1 - .01 = .99.
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minimum the sanction of the less severe of the two offenses,
i.e., pickpocketing. 4 Example 1 raises a straightforward dilem-
ma: If, using the DPP, the Example 1 defendant is acquitted of
all offenses, he will escape conviction despite the fact that the
probability that he committed at least one offense (.99) is
greater than the probability required for criminal conviction
(which is, under our assumption, .95). Individuals are routinely
convicted for committing a single offense on the basis of evi-
dence that establishes guilt with a lower probability (.95) than
the aggregate probability that arose from the evidence in Ex-
ample 1 (.99, for an unspecified offense). Applying the APP to
Example 1 would allow the prosecution to establish that the de-
fendant committed beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of
the two offenses with which he or she was charged. Arguably, it
is not just or efficient that the Example 1 defendant is acquit-
ted while, at the same time, a defendant charged with a single
offense that can be proven at a lower probability (.95 under our
initial assumption) is convicted.
To be sure, the probabilities in Example 1 (and also in the
other examples which follow) are merely illustrative. Courts
generally do not ascribe numerical probabilities to defendants'
guilt.5 Instead, when a court determines whether the reason-
4. If the defendant had been charged with four offenses instead of two,
this would yield a probability of .9999 that he had committed at least one of-
fense. Applying the APP would guarantee conviction for two offenses since the
probability that two offenses had been committed would be higher than the
threshold required for conviction. This is the outcome of a binomial distribu-
tion. There are four events and in each one the defendant either committed
the offense or did not (thus he either committed zero, one, two, three, or four
offenses and the probability that one of these scenarios transpired is one). To
calculate the probability that the defendant committed at least two of the four
offenses we subtract from one the probability that he committed zero offenses
or one offense. Since the probability that the defendant did not commit any
offense is (.1)4 = .0001, and the probability that he committed exactly one of-
fense is (.9) * (1)3* 4 = .0036 (.9 is the probability that he committed one spe-
cific offense; (.1)3 is the probability that he did not commit any of the other
three offenses; we multiply by four because the specific offense committed by
the defendant could be any of the four offenses), the probability that he com-
mitted at least two offenses is 1 - .0001 - .0036 = .9963. To calculate the prob-
ability that the defendant committed at least three offenses we add the proba-
bility that he committed four offenses to the probability that he committed
three offenses. Since the probability that the defendant committed four of-
fenses is (.9)4 and the probability that he committed three offenses is (.9)3 * .1 *
4, the probability that he committed at least three offenses comes to .6561 +
.2916 =.9477.
5. See, e.g., McCullough v. State, 657 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Nev. 1983) ("The
concept of reasonable doubt is inherently qualitative.").
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able-doubt standard was satisfied in a particular case, it em-
ploys a rough intuitive judgment which inherently encom-
passes at least some probabilistic component. 6 Therefore, to
understand the dilemma in Example 1, it is enough to recog-
nize the truism that when there is a likelihood that event A
took place (committing pickpocketing) and there is also a like-
lihood that event B took place (committing rape), and those
events are not fully interdependent on each other, the likelih-
ood that at least one of those events (A or B) took place is high-
er than the likelihood that either A took place or that B took
place.7
Example 1 illustrates how the APP can result in more con-
victions than the DPP. The APP can also result in fewer convic-
tions, as is illustrated in Example 2.
Example 2: A person is charged with pickpocketing
and rape, two unrelated offenses, allegedly committed
by him in different times and places. The evidence
suggests that the probability that he committed any
one of these offenses is .95. Assume that the required
probability necessary to satisfy the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard is .95. Should the court
convict the defendant on both offenses?
If the offenses are examined independently under the DPP,
then the defendant will be convicted on both charges. Yet, the
probability that the defendant committed both offenses is only
.9, which is lower than .95.8 In contrast, under the APP, the
court would convict the defendant of only one offense, since the
probability that he committed at least one offense is greater
than .95 (it is .9975). Even though similar rationales support
the application of the APP to cases represented by Examples 1
and 2, the focus of this Article is on cases where the APP would
result in more, rather than fewer, convictions-namely, those
cases represented by Example 1.
6. The .95 threshold has traditionally been used as an illustration in
texts that interpret the principle of beyond a reasonable doubt in probabilistic
terms. See David Kaye, Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U.
CHI. L. REV. 34, 40 (1979) ("Surely it is not some defect in probability theory
that restrains us from instructing jurors that they should convict so long as
they are, say, at least ninety-five percent certain that the defendant is
guilty.").
7. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
8. (.95)2 =.9025.
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Surprisingly, the possibility of using the APP in criminal
law has yet to be explored.9 Courts have never discussed or
considered the principle nor does case law suggest that a prose-
cutor or a defense lawyer has ever suggested applying it. Law-
yers as well as theorists seem to take it for granted that a per-
son can only be convicted for committing a specific identifiable
crime. 10 The APP deserves serious attention. Both justice and
efficiency considerations support applying the APP to a broad
range of cases. This Article addresses the most powerful objec-
tions to applying the APP in prevailing criminal law and pro-
poses that courts in certain instances adopt the APP. If the
APP is adopted as advocated, the presumption of innocence
currently applied with regard to the offense will be replaced
with a presumption of innocence applied with regard to the ac-
cused. Thus today, under the DPP, a defendant will be pre-
sumed innocent" and acquitted if the prosecution cannot per-
suade the court that he committed a specific offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. 12 In contrast, under the APP, the accused
will be presumed innocent and acquitted only if the prosecution
cannot show that no reasonable doubt exists that the accused
committed any offense.
9. In other fields, however, the APP has been considered and discussed
at length. For instance, legal theorists have proposed aggregating probabilities
in civil cases, and, as such, that discussion will not be explored in this Article.
See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 1, at 724 (discussing aggregating probabilities
mainly in tort cases). Furthermore, Frederick Schauer and Richard Zeckhaus-
er proposed aggregating probabilities across cases outside the judicial context.
Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, On the Degree of Confidence for Ad-
verse Decisions, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 41-51 (1996). Schauer & Zeckhauser
argue that it would make sense for a school to dismiss a teacher against whom
several complaints of sexual harassment had been made in the past, even if
each complaint, considered separately, would not constitute sufficient reason
for dismissal. Schauer & Zeckhauser maintain, however, that such an argu-
ment is inapplicable to criminal proceedings. Id. "Of course, the practice of
noncumulation of charges in the criminal law serves important goals. ... Ob-
viously there are costs associated with these goals ... but weighing the costs
and benefits of the refusal to cumulate in the criminal process is not our goal."
Id. at 45-46.
10. See, e.g., Wicks v. Lockhart, 569 F. Supp. 549, 565 n.18 (E.D. Ark.
1983) (noting that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each
offense charged).
11. See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 517 (1976) ("One of the es-
sential due process safeguards that attends the accused at his trial is the ben-
efit of the presumption of innocence .... .").
12. See, e.g., Wicks, 569 F. Supp. at 565 n.18 ("It is axiomatic that the
government bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt as to each
offense charged. . . .").
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Part I introduces the APP, explores its potential scope, and
discusses the applicability of the APP to different types of cas-
es. Part II distinguishes the APP from other types of aggrega-
tions of probabilities conducted in both criminal and tort law,
such as the market share liability, and prior-acts and similar-
crimes doctrines. This Part also explores the rare instances
when use of the APP should be precluded from the outset. Part
III argues that the APP should be adopted because it does a
better job than the DPP of fulfilling the overarching social goals
of criminal law--deterrence, efficient law enforcement, and mi-
nimization of adjudication errors. Part IV raises several possi-
ble practical objections to the APP, most importantly its poten-
tial abuse by the police and prosecution and the difficulties in
its implementation, but shows that these objections are not
compelling enough to justify rejecting the APP outright. Final-
ly, Part V analyzes expressivist theories as means of explaining
why courts are precluded from adopting the APP, but argues
that even expressivists should recognize circumstances where
conviction of the defendant on the basis of the APP is justifia-
ble. 13
I. INTRODUCING THE AGGREGATE PROBABILITIES
PRINCIPLE
To convict a person in a criminal trial the prosecution must
prove the charges "beyond a reasonable doubt."14 The rationale
underlying this requirement as well as its precise meaning, are,
of course, controversial.' 5 Yet, it is undisputed that the stan-
dard has an important probabilistic aspect to itl6: the evidence
13. The APP could also be applied across civil cases. The considerations
for and against such application differ from those relevant to criminal cases,
and we leave that question to future consideration.
14. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[W]e explicitly hold that the
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.").
15. See Jessica N. Cohen, The Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: Giving
Meaning to a Critical Concept, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 677, 678 (1995) ("[B]ecause
reasonable doubt is a term of art it should be defined for the jury."); Thomas V.
Mulrine, Reasonable Doubt: How in the World Is It Defined?, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 195, 197-98, 210-25 (1997) (explaining various approaches to and
definitions of reasonable doubt); Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of
Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV.
105, 105 (1999) ("Most debate in judicial opinions and in the scholarly litera-
ture has focused on whether reasonable doubt should be defined for the jury,
and, if so, how it should be defined.").
16. See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAw 65 (2005) ("Adjudi-
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that grounds a conviction in a criminal trial must establish
that the defendant committed an offense with a high degree of
probability.17 Criminal and evidence law implicitly assume that
convicting a criminal for committing an offense requires prose-
cutors to meet the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard with
respect to each particular offense.18 This principle, the DPP,
has never been questioned.' 9
The APP challenges the main tenets of the DPP. The APP's
basic idea is that a defendant should be convicted for an offense
when it is certain, or almost certain, that he committed some
offense, even if the exact offense cannot be established. For ex-
ample, under the APP, the defendant in Example 1 would be
convicted for one offense, as the probability that he committed
no offense is .01.20 Or, if Example 1 is modified to encompass
four offenses, instead of two, then the defendant should be con-
victed of some offense because the probability that he commit-
ted no offense is one in ten thousand.21 To reduce the risk of ex-
cessive punishment, the APP would only inflict on the
defendant in Example 1 the least severe sanction (the punish-
ment for pickpocketing). The APP may sometimes harm, and at
other times benefit, defendants. Example 2 illustrates that un-
der the APP a defendant accused of two offenses where each of-
fense-if examined separately-can be proven beyond a rea-
cative fact-finding rests on probabilistic reasoning that derives from expe-
rience."); id. at 66 ("Any finding that fact-finders make can only be probable,
rather than certain.").
17. For those readers who are skeptical about mathematical calculations
in the legal context, it is possible to consider the same problem without resort-
ing to probabilities: should a court convict a defendant when there is no rea-
sonable doubt that he committed at least one of several charged offenses, but
it cannot be established which one he specifically committed? See L. Jonathan
Cohen, The Role of Evidential Weight in Criminal Proof, 66 B.U. L. REV. 635,
635 (1986) (stating that by trying to give an account of the standard of crimi-
nal proof in Pascalian terms, one reserves the crucial place in reasoning for
the assignment of a high value non-Pascalian function for the assessment of
evidential weight); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1372 75 (1971) ("Both
callousness and insecurity ... might be increased by the explicit quantification
of jury doubts in criminal trials-whether or not it would be factually accurate
to describe the trial system as imposing criminal sanctions in the face of quan-
titatively measured uncertainty in particular cases.").
18. See, e.g., Wicks v. Lockhart, 569 F. Supp. 549, 549 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
19. Id. at 565 n.18.
20. See supra Example 1.
21. See supra note 4.
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sonable doubt should not be convicted for both offenses, but ra-
ther, only for one. 22
Theoretically, the APP is applicable in all cases where a de-
fendant is charged with more than one offense. There are, how-
ever, some distinctions between different types of cases that
have potential normative significance in shaping the APP.
First, cases where a defendant is charged with identical of-
fenses are distinguishable from cases where he is charged with
different offenses (the nature-of-the-offense criterion). As dem-
onstrated later, theories of punishment, such as expressivism,
which ascribe great importance to the expressive function of
the criminal law, may insist that the APP not be used in cases
of different offenses but would tolerate it when the offenses are
similar or identical. 23 For example, expressivists would be re-
luctant to convict a person charged with pickpocketing or rape
of either offense when neither can be proven beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, even if it is almost certain that the person committed
at least one of them.24
A second distinction that may be relevant in shaping the
APP relates to the homogeneity of the offense. Even if the of-
fenses are identical in type, it would be easier-for expressiv-
ists in particular-to accept a conviction for what we label "ho-
mogenous offenses," namely, offenses whose nature and
severity are less dependent on the particular circumstances,
than to accept conviction for "heterogeneous offenses" (the ho-
mogeneity criterion). The severity of rape or murder depends
on numerous contextual considerations, whereas pickpocketing
or breaching the statutory speed limit are typically less prod-
ucts of circumstances.
A third distinction relates to the crime victim's identity. In
some cases, the relevant offenses are directed at the same vic-
tim, whereas in other cases, different victims are the targets of
the different offenses (the same-victim criterion). Thus, there
22. This is not to say, however, that the APP is neutral overall with re-
spect to defendants. There are not an identical number of expected convictions
and expected acquittals resulting from an application of the APP. The transi-
tion from the DPP to the APP can be expected to bring about more convictions
than acquittals, based on the observation that the APP, in taking into account
all probabilities from .01 to .94 (assuming .95 is the threshold for conviction),
increases the number of convictions, and only in taking into account probabili-
ties from .95 to .99 does it reduce the number of convictions. See supra Exam-
ple 2.
23. See discussion infra Part V.
24. Id.
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could be a difference between applying the APP to a case in
which an employee is accused of two thefts directed at his em-
ployer and applying it to the case of a defendant accused of two
such acts targeting different victims. This differentiation could
cut both ways: on the one hand, expressivists may find it more
acceptable to convict a person for an unspecified offense if it
can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that an offense was
committed against a single victim. The message conveyed by
conviction may serve to affirm the grievance of the victim. On
the other hand, when there is a single victim of all the alleged
offenses, the risk of interdependence of the charges that could
preclude the use of the APP may be greater. For example, there
could always be a concern that the employer, the alleged vic-
tim, actually sought to frame the accused leading to reasonable
doubt with respect to the latter's guilt in each one of the
charges.25
Fourth, the use of the APP seems more reasonable when
used to convict individuals for regulatory rather than criminal
offenses. Regulatory offenses are governed primarily by consid-
erations of deterrence26 and expressivist considerations (which
may preclude the use of the APP) are less applicable with re-
spect to these offenses (the regulatory-offense criterion).27 For
example, imagine a defendant being accused of violating the
speed limit on two different occasions and that the prosecution
could not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with re-
spect to each of the occasions. However, if the prosecution could
establish that he violated the speed limit on at least one occa-
sion, then the opposition to applying the APP is expected to be
much weaker than it is when applying the APP in cases such as
those discussed in Example 1.28
The fifth distinction relates to the difference between cases
in which the defendant is charged with all offenses simulta-
neously and those cases where he is charged with a new offense
after having been previously convicted or acquitted of other of-
fenses (the same-trial criterion). Compare Example 1, where
there are two simultaneously charged offenses and the evidence
25. As we elucidate later, interdependence could sometimes be a signifi-
cant obstacle in employing the APP. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
26. See Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Pro-
grams as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 633 n.89 (1995).
27. See infra Part V.
28. See supra Example 1.
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suggests that the probability that the defendant committed
each of the offenses is .9, with a case in which a person has
been acquitted once in the past because the probability that he
committed the past offense was only .9. Similarly, consider Ex-
ample 2, where the defendant is charged with two offenses,
each of which can be proven with a probability of .95, compared
to a case in which the defendant was convicted once in the past
because the evidence indicated a probability of .95 that he had
committed the given offense. Somewhat counterintuitively, ap-
plying the APP would yield higher chances of conviction for a
person acquitted in the past and lower chances of conviction for
someone convicted in the past. 29 Yet the case for applying the
APP across different trials, rather than different charges with-
in the same trial, is weaker because it undermines the finality
of judicial decisions and faces substantial challenges in imple-
mentation.30 We do not advocate this approach.
Finally, the APP is not limited to cases in which the prod-
uct of the aggregated probabilities is less than 1. Rather, it
could also apply to cases where there is no doubt whatsoever
that the defendant committed an offense, even though it cannot
be established which offense. Leo Katz has offered an illustra-
tive example of such a case 31 : Suppose a murder and a burglary
were committed at the same time in two different places, and
hidden cameras recorded both incidents. Unfortunately (for so-
ciety and for law enforcement authorities), the perpetrators of
these crimes are twin brothers. It is known, therefore, that
29. If the defendant was acquitted in the first trial because the probability
of his guilt was only .9, and in the second trial the probability of his guilt was
again .9, under the APP he should be convicted at the second trial. If, instead,
that defendant was convicted at the first trial because the probability of his
guilt was .95, under the APP he should not be convicted at the second trial.
Moreover, if in the latter case the probability of guilt in the second trial was
also .95 (and not .9), as illustrated by Example 2, applying the APP should al-
so lead to acquittal at the second trial.
30. First, the information obstacles in applying the APP across trials are
more serious than those that would arise across charges in the same trial. See
discussion infra Part IV.D. Second, taking into account prior acquittals as a
consideration for convicting the same defendant in a subsequent trial could
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Third, apply-
ing the APP across different trials in cases represented by Example 2 (when
the APP generates fewer, rather than more, convictions) could reduce deter-
rence of future crimes: a defendant who was convicted in a trial for one offense
at a probability of .95 will not be punished for a subsequent crime as long as
the prosecution cannot establish his guilt at a probability of 1. See discussion
infra Part III.B.
31. LEO KATZ, ILL-GO'ITEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND
KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 67-469 (1996).
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each of the two brothers committed one of the offenses. It is
unknown, however, which offense was committed by which
brother. Under the APP, both brothers would be convicted for
the lesser of the two crimes, namely, burglary.
These considerations establish that the APP may raise
both theoretical and practical difficulties and it may not be
possible to apply it across the board. We will later see that
these difficulties do not undermine the importance of the APP,
yet are relevant to determining its precise scope. The main con-
clusion that we reach at the end of the Article is that among
the various distinctions discussed above, the most important
one is the homogeneity criterion: the more heterogeneous the
crimes are, the more that the expressivist concerns preclude
the use of the APP. We suggest, however, that when the appli-
cation of the APP is strongly supported by deterrence, the APP
should apply even to heterogeneous offenses.
II. THE AGGREGATE PROBABILITIES PRINCIPLE IN
CONTEXT
A. AGGREGATING PROBABILITIES UNDER PREVAILING LAW
Aggregating probabilities is not an unfamiliar phenomenon
in the legal system.32 This Part is devoted to examining cases of
aggregation which are already familiar to the legal system and
showing how these cases differ from the APP.
The issue of aggregating probabilities takes place in fact-
finding procedures when a judge or jury determines whether a
conjunction of facts or events transpired.33 For each of the facts
or events comprising the set, there is a specific probability cor-
relating to each fact or event. Aggregating these probabilities
enables the judge or jury to determine whether the plaintiff or
the prosecution proved a conjunction of all the facts or events to
a sufficient degree. 34 Alternatively, the probability that at least
one fact took place requires an aggregation of a different sort.35
32. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 33, 40 (Cal. 1968); ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 460-66 (5th ed. 2008) (discuss-
ing the aggregation of probabilities in tort law).
33. See Robert Cooter, Adapt or Optimize? The Psychology and Economics
of Rules of Evidence, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAw 379, 380 (G. Gigerenzer &
C. Engels eds., 2006).
34. Id. at 384-87.
35. See Levmore, supra note 1, at 729-30 n.11 (labeling this alternate me-
thod "reverse conjunction").
2009] 271
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Let us start with the first scenario. Suppose a judge in a
civil case must decide (1) whether the defendant was negligent
and (2) whether he caused the given injury. Only if both ques-
tions are answered affirmatively will the defendant be found
liable.36 Assume that the judge or jury estimates the probabili-
ty of the defendant's negligence at .6 and the probability that
he caused the injury at .6 as well. Aggregating the probabilities
yields a probability of .36 that the defendant was both negli-
gent and caused the injury (the civil-cumulative case). If the
judge's or the jury's decision rests on the .36 aggregation, then
the plaintiff will fail to satisfy the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard and the defendant will be found not liable.37
If each component of the cause of action is considered separate-
ly, however, the plaintiff will win, since the probability of each
component amounts to .6. Legal theorists disagree as to wheth-
er an aggregation of probabilities rule should be applied in such
a case, 38 and case law seems inclined against using aggregation
in such cases.39
Similar difficulties arise in cases of disjunctive liability
where the defendant is liable if either scenario A or scenario B
took place. Assume that scenarios A and B each involve con-
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281(b)-(c) (1965) (listing
these two elements as required for negligence liability).
37. See Alex Stein, Of Two Wrongs That Make a Right: Two Paradoxes of
the Evidence Law and Their Combined Economic Justification, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1199, 1205 (2001) (explaining the rationale of aggregating probabilities in the
civil-cumulative case).
38. To consider the applicability of the "product rule"-which is the rule
that mandates the aggregation of probabilities-compare Maya Bar-Hillel,
Probabalistic Analysis in Legal Factfinding, 56 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 267, 269
(1984) ("[T]he conjunction of a small number of weakly probative characteris-
tics can be strongly probative."), and Bernard Robertson & G. A. Vignaux,
Probability-The Logic of the Law, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 457, 478 (1993)
("Once one regards probability as a generalisation of logic and has freed one's
mind from the shackles of frequentist examples and the Mind Projection Fal-
lacy, these objections [to the use of probabilities] evaporate. The logical rules
for thinking about facts in legal cases are those of probability."), with L. JONA-
THAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 58-67 (1977) (discussing the
problems of conjunction of facts or probabilities and claiming that mathemati-
cal probability is inadequate as a model for rational thinking). See also Stein,
supra note 37, at 1203-05 (considering the effect of the "conjunction paradox"
on the use of the product rule, but suggesting that, in light of another major
distortion in fact-finding, the product rule leads to a second-best solution).
39. See Levmore, supra note 1, at 752 nn.58-60 (arguing that no jurisdic-
tion explicitly recognizes the product rule and explaining that such non-
recognition could be warranted mainly in those cases where decisions are
made by either a jury or another multimember panel, either unanimously or
by supermajority).
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flicting types of negligence, either of which could have caused
the injury suffered by the plaintiff. Assume that the probability
of scenario A is .3, that the probability of scenario B is also .3,
and that these probabilities are independent of one another.
The defendant is liable under either scenario A or scenario B
because the probability that at least one of the scenarios oc-
curred amounts to .51.40 Thus, aggregating the probabilities in
such a case (the civil-alternative case) would generate a differ-
ent decision than when each probability is considered separate-
ly. 4 1 The legal system is ambivalent with respect to aggregation
in such cases. 42 As in the civil-cumulative case, courts generally
reject the aggregation principle in civil-alternative cases. 43 Yet
some important exceptions exist. In tort law, for instance, prov-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's
wrongful act caused an injury is normally sufficient to impose
liability, even if the plaintiff cannot prove by the same stan-
dard what precisely made the defendant's act wrongful. 44
Finally, aggregating probabilities is also relevant in crimi-
nal cases. 45 As discussed above with respect to civil cases, if
several components of the offense must be proven to establish
the defendant's guilt, then aggregating the probabilities of each
40. The probability that none of the events took place is .7 * .7 = .49. The
probability that at least one of them took place is 1 - .49 = .51. If the scenarios
exclude one another, then the probability that at least one took place is .3 + .3
= .6.
41. See Levmore, supra note 1, at 729 n.11, 745-46 (explaining the "alter-
native routes" scenario, which he labels "reverse conjunction"). Levmore uses
the same reasoning for rejecting the product rule in the civil-alternative case
as in the civil-cumulative case. See id. at 752 nn.58-60.
42. Compare Tribe, supra note 17, at 1361 (claiming that hard statistical
data lead decisionmakers into "[d]warfing [the] soft variables" by assuming
that "[i]f you can't count it, it doesn't exist"), with Jonathan J. Koehler & Da-
niel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the
Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247,
265 (1990) (stating that psychological research does not support Tribe's as-
sumption, but rather "suggests that, in a wide range of situations, people gen-
erally undervalue base rate evidence and attach too much weight to case-
specific evidence").
43. See Levmore, supra note 1, at 729 n.11 (stating that courts do not ap-
ply the product rule).
44. DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 154, at 370-73 (2001) (describing
res ipsa loquitur cases where the jury is permitted to infer that the defendant
was negligent in causing the harm in a specific scenario, even though evidence
of any specific negligent act cannot be established).
45. See Bar-Hillel, supra note 38, at 268-70, 282-83 (analyzing the use of
probabilities in cases and suggesting a "soft role ... for probability in the fact-
finding process"). But see People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 33, 40 (Cal. 1968) (re-
jecting the use of probabilities in determining guilt on the facts of the case).
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component separately generates a different outcome than an
integrated aggregation of the probabilities.46 For instance, if
convicting a person for burglary requires both trespass and in-
tent to commit a crime, the judgment could be different in ac-
cordance with the method of aggregation. Thus, even if each
component of the offense (e.g., trespass and intent) can be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, reasonable doubt could still
exist with respect to the cumulative presence of all components
(the criminal-cumulative case).47 Will the court convict the de-
fendant under such circumstances? The answer is unclear.4 8
The APP differs substantively from aggregation in both the
civil and criminal cumulative cases because it does not question
when courts ought to convict a defendant for a particular spe-
cific offense. Aggregating probabilities in civil and criminal cu-
mulative cases determines whether the person committed the
particular wrongful act or offense. Liability in a civil context or
conviction in a criminal context implies that the court was sa-
tisfied that the evidence justified the imposition of liability or
criminal conviction for a particular act. Conversely, a finding
that a defendant is not liable (in a civil context) or not guilty (in
a criminal context) implies that the court cannot justify liability
or conviction for a particular act. This Article, however, ex-
amines alternative rather than cumulative cases: cases in
which no specific offense can be attributed to the defendant al-
though it is evident (or at least sufficiently probable) that the
defendant committed an offense. Indeed, in contrast to the civil
and criminal cumulative cases, the APP is about substantive
criminal law rather than fact-finding. This Article focuses on
the commission of an unspecified offense and does not discuss
46. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
47. See Levmore, supra note 1, at 729 (suggesting that the product rule
can equally apply to the civil-cumulative case and the criminal-cumulative
case).
48. Compare id. at 733 n.19 (suggesting that the defense might benefit
from a rule of aggregation when it reminds the jury of all the doubts that have
been raised and implies that, combined, they create more than a reasonable
doubt), with Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Para-
digm for Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 138 (2003) (discussing the
rule of aggregation in the context of voting by judges in a panel or by jurors
and observing that "[a]lthough a criminal defendant cannot be convicted un-
less a jury unanimously finds each element of the crime charged proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, 'a federal jury need not always decide unanimous-
ly which of several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular
element, say, which of several possible means the defendant used to commit
an element of the crime"' (citation omitted)).
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how to establish whether any particular offense has been com-
mitted.
The civil-alternative case is much more relevant to the
APP. The APP involves aggregating the probabilities and im-
posing liability on the basis of that aggregation even if it cannot
be established what misdeed the defendant committed. In tort
law, a failure to prove precisely all the detailed facts concern-
ing the wrongful act does not preclude the attribution of liabili-
ty.4 9 Thus, "if a car parked at the curb by the defendant begins
to roll downhill" and the reason for this could be that the de-
fendant "either failed to set the brakes or failed to cut the
wheels properly against the curb, or failed to put the car in
parking gear," then the trier of fact could find the defendant li-
able even without knowing exactly why he was at fault.50 But
the issues raised by civil tort claims, such as this one, diverge
from the criminal cases we focus on in this Article: whereas in
the former, it relates to different possible misdeeds related to
the same act (the wrongful parking of a car), in the latter, the
indeterminacy relates to completely different acts.
The APP is closely related to the tort law doctrine of mar-
ket share liability (MSL), which was applied by some courts in
the diethylstilbesterol (DES) cases.6 ' A drug designed to pre-
vent miscarriages, DES was manufactured by hundreds of
companies mainly in the 1950s and turned out to be latently
carcinogenic to female fetuses.52 Twenty-five years later, many
of the young women whose mothers had taken the drug were
diagnosed with cancer of their reproductive organs.53 Courts
found that the drug had not been tested adequately prior to its
marketing and that the manufacturers had failed to take into
account certain findings that had pointed to a risk of carcino-
genic effects. 54 Furthermore, the plaintiffs' mothers had never
been cautioned against this risk.55 Finally, the drug was mar-
keted under a generic name, which foiled plaintiffs' attempts to
trace each pill back to its actual manufacturer.56 For the pur-
49. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
50. For this example and others,-see DOBBS, supra note 44, § 154, at 372.
51. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936-38 (Cal. 1980) (holding
drug manufacturers liable even when proving which specific manufacturer
produced the drug in question is not possible).
52. Id. at 925.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 925-26.
55. Id. at 926.
56. Id.
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pose of providing a remedy to the victims, the courts developed
the MSL doctrine. Under this doctrine, first adopted by the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in Sindell," every defendant properly
joined would be held liable for the plaintiff's damage unless he
could successfully prove that he did not manufacture the drug
taken by the plaintiff's mother.58 As the Sindell court further
clarified in its decision, liability would be imposed only on those
manufacturers who had produced a substantial proportion of
the DES drugs in the relevant market. 59 The court ultimately
decided that the burden of compensating each plaintiff for her
damage would be allocated among the manufacturers in accor-
dance with their respective shares of the DES market.60
The MSL doctrine amounts to an aggregation of probabili-
ties in the judicial decision-making process in a way that re-
sembles the APP. To better understand how, imagine that
there are ten manufacturers in the market who produced and
sold an identical hazardous product (like DES) to consumers,
thereby causing identical injuries to one thousand people. As-
sume also that all the manufacturers have identical shares in
the market and that it is completely impossible to trace any in-
jury back to a specific manufacturer. In a single case brought
by a single plaintiff, the probability that any single manufac-
turer caused the injury is .1, which is far below the required
threshold for liability. However, the probability that a single
manufacturer caused at least .1 of the total harm-the sum of
harms caused to all victims-is more than sufficient to justify
imposing liability on that manufacturer. The MSL doctrine
leads precisely to this result: once all suits have been resolved
57. Id. at 937; see also Hymovitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078
(N.Y. 1989) (applying a modified version of the MSL doctrine); Martin v. Ab-
bott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 381 (Wash. 1984) (same); Collins v. Eli Lilly [&] Co.,
342 N.W.2d 37, 49 (Wis. 1984) (same). But see Kurczi v. Eli Lilly & Co., 113
F.3d 1426, 1433 (6th Cir. 1997) (rejecting application of the MSL doctrine un-
der Ohio law).
58. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937.
59. Id.
60. Id. It is not clear whether this decision should be interpreted as im-
posing liability on each defendant for all the plaintiffs' damage (with the
proper allocation achieved through indemnification claims between the co-
defendants) or as imposing liability on each defendant for only part of the
damage. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 485-87 (Cal. 1988)
(adopting the second interpretation of imposing several liability on each de-
fendant for only part of the damage); ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIA-
BILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 138, 148 (2001) (discussing the policies behind
the two alternative rules).
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each manufacturer will bear .1 of the total harm as there is suf-
ficient evidence that he caused at least .1 of the total harm.
The MSL doctrine is, therefore, an analogous tort law prin-
ciple to the APP criminal law principle: both aggregate proba-
bilities and determine liability accordingly. 61 It should be
noted, however, that the MSL doctrine has been applied almost
exclusively in cases involving identical conduct and risks
created by all wrongdoers toward all the victims. 6 2 Most of the
courts that applied the MSL doctrine to DES cases refused to
apply it in the absence of these features. 63 The corresponding
criminal cases would thus be those where the criminal acts at-
tributed to the defendants with various probabilities are iden-
tical. At the same time, the MSL doctrine was applied to the
DES cases even though there were numerous victims and the
probability of a single defendant having caused injury to a spe-
cific victim was rather small.6 4 Hence, the MSL doctrine is
premised on the view that defendants can be found liable when
no harm to a specific plaintiff can be attributed to them.
Great caution must be taken when expanding criminal lia-
bility on the basis of analogies with tort law. Tort law and crim-
inal law have different goals,65 and the doctrines in each field
61. Both principles differ from the alternative liability principle set by the
California Supreme Court in Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948), which
bears some superficial resemblance to the APP. In Summers, the defendants
were two individuals who had participated in quail hunting. Id. at 2. The
plaintiff had been shot in the eye by a stray bullet negligently fired by one of
the defendants. Id. The defendants pulled their triggers simultaneously, so it
could not be determined whose bullet had actually injured the plaintiff. Id.
The court resolved the case by establishing the "alternative liability" principle,
which shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant "to absolve
himself if he can." Id. at 4. Thus, "[d]efendants unable to disassociate them-
selves evidentially from the damage are, therefore, held liable for the entire
damage." PORAT & STEIN, supra note 60, at 61. This principle ultimately found
its way into the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B, illus. 9 (1965), but
has nothing in common with the aggregation of probabilities dealt with in this
article. In Summers, there was a fifty percent probability for each of the de-
fendants that he had hit the plaintiff, and this probability was not the result
of any aggregation. 199 P.2d at 2. It seems that the only aggregation of prob-
abilities that could be conducted would be on the side of the plaintiff rather
than the defendant: the probability that the plaintiff suffered an injury from
wrongful shooting would be the aggregate of the probabilities that each defen-
dant had separately caused the injury. This would yield a probability of 1.
62. PORAT & STEIN, supra note 60, at 64-65 (discussing the limits of the
MSL doctrine and citing cases).
63. But see id. at 65-67 (2001) (discussing cases in which the MSL doc-
trine was applied).
64. See id. at 60-62.
65. See generally OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 34-
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should be responsive to those goals. Aggregating probabilities
could serve as a deterrent and, not surprisingly, in torts the
main justification for the MSL doctrine is to provide potential
tortfeasors with efficient incentives. 66 Deterrence is also held to
be an important goal of criminal law.6 7 Yet unlike tort law, re-
tributive and expressivist considerations play a central role as
well.68 This could explain why a more compelling case for ag-
gregating probabilities can be made in tort law than in criminal
law.
B. PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR AND INTERDEPENDENCE
This Section is divided into two subsections. First, it diff-
erentiates the APP from two existing doctrines: the prior-acts
and similar-crimes doctrines.69 Under both of these doctrines,
past similar behavior on the part of the defendant can be used
as evidence supporting conviction.70 But these two doctrines,
termed "the pattern-of-behavior doctrines," are distinct from
the APP. Whereas the pattern-of-behavior doctrines are based
on the probabilistic interdependence of the offenses attributed
to the defendant, the APP is most appropriately applied when
those offenses are entirely independent of one another.
Second, this Section explores the relevance of the interde-
pendence of the offenses to the application of the APP, and es-
tablishes the conditions under which interdependence prec-
ludes such application. Interdependence of the offenses,
however, is not necessarily a reason not to apply the APP. As is
shown, under certain conditions, the APP would apply even
when offenses are interdependent, and occasionally even in
tandem with the pattern-of-behavior doctrines.
43 (Transaction Publishers 2005) (1881) (comparing the different goals of the
criminal law); PORAT & STEIN, supra note 60, at 1-15 (considering the evolu-
tion of Anglo-American tort doctrine).
66. See PORAT & STEIN, supra note 60, at 130-59 (discussing the justifica-
tions for the MSL doctrine); Mark A. Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alterna-
tive Liability and Market-Share Liability, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 447, 449 (2007)
(discussing the deterrent effect of the MSL doctrine).
67. See HOLMES, supra note 65, at 36-46.
68. But see Ronen Perry, The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common
Law of Torts: A Descriptive Theory, 73 TENN. L. REV. 177, 188-92 (2006) (ar-
guing that retributive justice has an influence on the development of tort law
doctrines).
69. See FED. R. EVID. 403, 413, 414.
70. Id.
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1. Prior-Acts and Similar-Crimes Doctrines
Under the prior-acts doctrine, which was adopted in Rule
404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 7' the prosecution can
bring evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts that can be at-
tributed to the defendant to establish motive, opportunity, in-
tent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mis-
take or accident. 72 This evidence cannot be used to prove the
defendant's bad character and courts are required to instruct
the jury accordingly. 73 Interestingly, under Rule 404(b), as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court, even conduct that has been
the subject of a prior acquittal can be submitted as evidence by
the prosecution in a subsequent trial in order to support convic-
tion. 74 Judge Easterbrook has interpreted the Rule not as one
of admissibility, because it "says that evidence 'may' be admiss-
ible for a given purpose, not that it is automatically admissi-
ble."75
The similar-crimes doctrine, adopted in Rules 413 and 414
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, applies to sexual assault and
71. See id. 404(b). See also United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 137 (4th
Cir. 1973), where the court stated prior to the enactment of Rule 404(b):
Unlike other cases where evidence of prior crimes is admissible for
only limited purposes and where it is necessary or proper to give lim-
iting instructions, evidence of the prior events was admissible here to
prove both that Paul was the victim of infanticide and that defendant
was the perpetrator of the crime.
72. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
73. See People v. Quinn, 486 N.W.2d 139, 140 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)
("Where, however, evidence of a defendant's other wrongful acts has been ad-
mitted for the limited purposes allowed under MRE 404(b), the prosecutor de-
prives the defendant of a fair trial in arguing that the jury should consider the
evidence as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt."); see also Huddle-
ston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689-92 (1988) (holding that the trial court
is not required to make a preliminary finding that the petitioner proved com-
mission of the similar acts by a preponderance of the evidence). Evidence of
other crimes is usually submitted in criminal, not civil, procedures. Rule
404(b), however, contains no such limitation, and potential civil applications
occasionally arise. See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 741-42
(6th Cir. 2005) (ruling that a statement made by a high-ranking official re-
garding lesbians in the city's police department was admissible under Rule
404(b)).
74. See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1990) (hold-
ing that testimony tending to prove that the defendant had committed a crime,
which had been brought in a prior trial that ended in acquittal, was rightly
admitted under Rule 404(b) by the court in a subsequent trial because it estab-
lished the defendant's identity).
75. United States v. Jones, 455 F.3d 800, 810 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easter-
brook, J., concurring).
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child molestation offenses.76 Under this doctrine, if the defen-
dant is accused of one of these types of offenses, "evidence of
the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of
sexual assault or child molestation is admissible, and may be
considered for its bearing on any other matter to which it is re-
levant."77
The superficial similarity between the pattern-of-behavior
doctrines and the APP stems from their shared feature, namely
that all three consider the past behavior of the defendant and
affirm that past behavior influences the likelihood of convic-
tion.78 But, this resemblance notwithstanding, there is a sub-
stantial difference between them. The pattern-of-behavior doc-
trines are rooted in the premise that a person who has
committed several offenses in the past is more likely to either
have intended or have actually committed the offense of which
that person is presently accused. The defendant's past behavior
thus modifies the probability of his guilt in the current case. It
is the interdependence between the past offense and the
present alleged offense that provides the grounds for convic-
tion. In contrast, the APP is simply based on the truism that
the probability that a person committed one of two offenses (A
or B) is greater than the probability that he committed A and
greater than the probability that he committed B (unless there
is full interdependence between the two offenses). The APP is
not based on any interdependence between the offenses attri-
buted to the defendant: the probability that he committed one
offense does not change the probability that he committed
another. Rather, only the probability that he committed an un-
specified offense is affected.79
76. FED. R. EVID. 413, 414.
77. Id. Under Rule 415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence this doctrine is
also applicable to civil cases involving sexual assault and child molestation.
See Louis M. Natali Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, 'Are You Going to Arraign His
Whole Life?'" How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process Clause,
28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 29 (1997) ("By requiring the admission of propensity
evidence, the rules prevent a fundamentally fair trial, and thus violate due
process . . . .').
78. As Example 2 illustrates, sometimes the APP leads to acquittal rather
than to conviction. See supra Example 2.
79. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006), can be interpreted as a tool for punishing indi-
viduals for unspecified offenses. Under RICO, a person who is a member of an
enterprise that has committed any two specified crimes within a ten-year pe-
riod can be charged with racketeering. Id. The racketeering offense can thus
be seen as a mechanism for punishing individuals who are more likely to have
committed serious unknown crimes. Arguably, one can infer from the type of
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2. Interdependence
Understanding the relationship between interdependence
and the APP is crucial for setting the APP's scope and limits.
As seen in this Section, interdependence may (although need
not be) a reason not to apply the APP.
To illustrate the difference between the APP and the pat-
tern-of-behavior doctrines and understand under what circum-
stances interdependence precludes the use of the APP, let us
return to Example 1 and its defendant, who is being tried for
two unrelated offenses: pickpocketing and rape.80 In this scena-
rio, it is quite obvious that the pattern-of-behavior doctrines
are not applicable, as there is no reason to believe that a person
who committed pickpocketing would also commit rape. But, as-
sume now that the two offenses are sexual assaults. In this
case, the prior-acts and similar-crimes doctrines could be ap-
plied to bring evidence of prior acts to support the allegation
that the defendant either committed the sexual assaults or in-
tended to do so.81 The evidence relating to each of the two
charges would then bolster the case against the defendant with
respect to the other charge.82 Indeed, a defendant who commit-
ted a sexual assault in the past is said to be more likely to have
committed a later act of sexual assault. 83
criminal activity committed by those convicted under RICO their engagement
in other activities-activities that have not been detected or proven. Yet, it is
quite evident that this is not the central purpose of RICO: the Act targets not
those who are more likely to have committed other crimes but people whose
criminal activity is particularly harmful because it contributes to organized
crime. Hence, RICO cannot be construed as serving goals similar to those of
the APP. Note that under the prior-acts and similar-crimes doctrines, the fact
that a person committed several similar offenses in the past increases the
chances of conviction in the present case. Under the APP, in contrast, as illu-
strated by Example 2, the fact that a person was convicted of several offenses
in the past decreases the probability of conviction in a later case. See supra
Example 2. However, we do not suggest applying the APP across different tri-
als. See infra Part IV.D.
80. See supra Example 1.
81. FED. R. EVID. 403, 413, 414.
82. See, e.g., Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 137 F.3d 490, 495 (7th
Cir. 1998) (admitting evidence of plaintiff's prior lawsuits to show, inter alia,
"Gastineau's modus operandi of creating fraudulent documents in anticipation
of litigation against his employers").
83. See Jodi Leibowitz, Note, Criminal Statutes of Limitations: An Ob-
stacle to the Prosecution and Punishment of Child Sexual Abuse, 25 CARDOZO
L. REV. 907, 939 n.127 (2003) ("For any sexual abuser, the likelihood that he
has performed a similar abuse in the past-and that he will repeat it in the
future-is extremely high.").
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Assume, however, that even with the application of the
prior-acts and similar-crimes doctrines, none of the charges can
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Suppose that, for each of
the charges in the modified version of Example 1, there is a
probability of .7 that the defendant committed the offense. But,
once the two doctrines are applied, this probability increases to
.9 for each while the threshold for conviction is .95. The APP is
necessary to guarantee conviction in such a case. But, as is
shown below, it is unclear whether the APP would be applica-
ble.
One central consideration in determining whether the APP
should apply relates to the type of doubts the court has with re-
spect to the defendant's guilt. If the same doubt exists with re-
spect to all charges brought against the defendant, the APP
should not apply. In contrast, if there are different and inde-
pendent doubts with respect to each offense, the APP should
apply, either by supplementing the pattern-of-behavior doc-
trines or as an alternative to them.
Example 3, a variation of Example 1, is illustrative of
same-doubt cases.
Example 3-Same Doubt: A person is charged with
two offenses of sexual assault allegedly committed by
him at different times and places with two different
victims. When each case is examined separately, the
evidence suggests that the probability that he commit-
ted each offense is .7. Applying the pattern-of-
behavior doctrines increases this probability to .9. The
reason the court is not fully persuaded that the defen-
dant committed each of the offenses is that it suspects
that a specific person-the defendant's enemy-has
framed him. Assume that the required probability ne-
cessary to satisfy the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard is .95. Should the court use the APP and
convict the defendant for any of the offenses?
The answer is no. The APP should not apply and the de-
fendant should be acquitted of both charges. If the defendant's
enemy framed him in one case, it is also likely that he framed
him in another. Therefore, there is a probability of .9 that the
defendant committed the two offenses and a probability of .1
that he committed no offense at all. The probability that he
committed only one offense is close to zero. Consequently, the
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interdependence between the two offenses attributed to the de-
fendant precludes conviction.
It is also possible that the doubts with respect to each of
the charges differ and are independent of one another, as the
following example demonstrates:
Example 4-Independent Doubts: A person is
charged with two offenses of sexual assault allegedly
committed by him at different times and places
against two different victims. The evidence in each
case examined separately indicates a probability of .7
that the defendant is guilty of each alleged offense.
Assume now that after applying the pattern-of-
behavior doctrines, that probability increases to .9.
The reason the court is not fully persuaded that the
defendant committed each one of the offenses is be-
cause it is not clear that the complainants did not give
their consent. The absence of victim consent is a pre-
condition for convicting the defendant under prevail-
ing law. At the same time the court is completely per-
suaded that the defendant committed all the acts
attributed to him and also that he had the requisite
intention for committing both sexual assaults. Assume
that the required probability for satisfying the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in the legal sys-
tem is .95. Should the court convict the defendant of
any one of the offenses?
In contrast to the case in Example 3, the APP should be
applied in this situation. Since the court's doubts with respect
to each charge are independent of one another (the victim in
each case is different and the respective doubts relating to each
victim's consent are independent of one another), the probabili-
ty that the defendant committed at least one of the sexual as-
saults is .99. In this case, then, the interdependence between
the two charges, due to a pattern of behavior indicating a dis-
position to carry out the offenses, does not hinder applying the
APP in tandem with the pattern-of-behavior doctrines.
In other cases, even if the doubts in each case were differ-
ent, applying the pattern-of-behavior doctrines would preclude
the use of the APP. If the pattern-of-behavior doctrines are not
applied, however, the APP could be applied. Example 5 illu-
strates such cses:
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Example 5-Differing Interdependent Doubts: A
person is charged with two offenses of sexual assault
allegedly committed by him at different times and
places against two different victims. Examined sepa-
rately, the evidence in each case indicates a probabili-
ty of .7 that the defendant committed each one of the
offenses. When the pattern-of-behavior doctrines are
applied, this probability increases to .9. The reason
the court is not persuaded that the defendant commit-
ted each of the offenses is that, in each case, there is a
different lone eyewitness whose reliability is ques-
tionable. Assume that the probability required for the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in the legal sys-
tem is .95. Should the court convict the defendant of
any of the offenses?
In this Example, once the pattern-of-behavior doctrines are
applied, the APP should not apply. The reason for this is that,
in this Example, using the APP becomes too complicated. If one
eyewitness in the Example is a liar (or had made a mistake),
then not only would acquittal of the relevant offense be justi-
fied, but also the probability of the defendant's guilt of the oth-
er offense would decrease from .9 to .7. Thus, even though ag-
gregating the probabilities in such cases is theoretically
possible, it is impractical. This, however, does not rule out us-
ing the APP instead of the pattern-of-behavior doctrines. In
Example 5, the APP would yield a probability of .91 that the
defendant committed at least one of the alleged offenses.84 This,
by itself, would not be grounds for conviction. But, a different
outcome would be obtained if, instead of .7, the probability of
the defendant's guilt in each charge when examined separately
was .8.85
The following conclusions can be drawn from the above dis-
cussion:
1. The APP should not be applied when identical doubts ex-
ist with respect to all of the alleged offenses. This is true re-
gardless of whether the pattern-of-behavior doctrines are ap-
plied. 86
84. 1 -(.3)=.91.
85. 1 - (.2) =.96.
86. See supra Example 3.
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2. The APP should not be applied when the offenses raise
differing doubts if the pattern-of-behavior doctrines are applied
and the probability of the defendant's guilt on each charge after
applying these doctrines depends on his guilt of the other al-
leged offenses.87
3. The APP should be applied when a different doubt arises
with respect to each offense and the pattern-of-behavior doc-
trines are not applied.88
4. The APP should be applied when the doubts differ with
respect to each offense, even if the pattern-of-behavior doc-
trines are applied, as long as the respective probabilities of the
defendant's guilt in each offense after the doctrines have been
applied are not impacted by whether he is guilty of the other
offenses. 89
These conclusions support broad application of the APP. As
long as the pattern-of-behavior doctrines are not applied and
the doubt with respect to each charge has a different source, in-
terdependence of the offenses does not preclude the application
of the APP. Since the pattern-of-behavior doctrines have quite
narrow application under prevailing law, the APP will seldom
be precluded because of interdependence. Thus, in Example 1,
even if we could show that the proportion of rapists among
pickpockets were higher than in the general population, so that
some degree of interdependence between the two offenses were
to exist, it would not affect the suitability of the APP to the cir-
cumstances of this Example.
Furthermore, even when the pattern-of-behavior doctrines
are applied, there are many situations-as demonstrated in
Example 4-that meet the condition of a lack of interdepen-
dence between the different charges after application of the
pattern-of-behavior doctrines. Other examples of this type are
those in which the defendant's guilt in the offenses with which
he is charged rests on an outcome that is beyond his control.
For example, suppose a defendant who is a gang member is
charged with two murders, allegedly committed by him at dif-
ferent times and at different places in the presence of other
gang members. Assume now that the court, after applying the
prior-acts doctrine, is sufficiently convinced that the defendant
shot the victims in both cases with the requisite intent of com-
87. See supra Example 5.
88. See supra Example 1 and modified Example 4 where the pattern-of-
behavior doctrines are not applied.
89. See supra Example 4.
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mitting murder. But, in each case, there is .1 probability that
someone else's bullet hit the victim instead. Assuming again
that .95 probability is required for conviction, the APP would
result in a conviction for one murder and one attempted mur-
der.90
III. THE CASE FOR THE AGGREGATE PROBABILITIES
PRINCIPLE
This Part provides reasons why the APP is a desirable rule
and ought to be used by courts. There are three main advan-
tages of the APP: First, the APP minimizes adjudication errors
and makes the criminal law system more coherent, fair, and
less discriminatory in treating those errors. Second, the APP is
conducive to deterrence. Third, the APP reduces the costs of en-
forcement.
A. ADJUDICATION ERRORS
Adopting the APP in criminal law will likely increase the
number of errors in convicting the innocent (false positives or
Type I errors) and decrease the number of errors in acquitting
90. Jeremy Bentham argued that when there is evidence that the same
convicted person escaped detection by the law in the past, the sanction to be
inflicted in the present conviction should reflect this fact. JEREMY BENTHAM,
Of the Proportion Between Punishments and Offences, in AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 165, 170 (J. H. Burns & H. L.
A. Hart eds., 1970). Bentham maintained that in setting the punishment, "it
may be necessary, in some cases to take into account the profit not only of the
individual offence to which the punishment is to be annexed, but also of such
other offences of the same sort as the offender is likely to have already commit-
ted without detection." Id. We thank Avraham Tabbach for referring us to
Bentham's thoughts on this issue. One way to interpret Bentham's argument
is as the converse to our understanding of the prior-acts and similar-crimes
doctrines: whereas in the latter doctrines, the court infers from past behavior
forward to the present charge, Bentham urged courts to infer from the present
charge backward to past behavior. The ramifications of this reading of Ben-
tham's claim are that we can increase punishment in a present conviction in
order to punish the convicted defendant for past behavior that, in light of the
present conviction, can be more easily attributed to him now. Indeed, both the
APP and Bentham's proposal are motivated by a concern for the underen-
forcement of the law: the APP would be rendered completely meaningless if
there were no under-enforcement and it had been always possible to fully and
accurately detect all criminals. But, as already explained, the APP is based on
the conjecture of independence of the relevant probabilities, whereas Ben-
tham's proposal is founded on the opposite assumption, namely, that if the de-
fendant committed one offense, it is more likely he had committed other of-
fenses in the past. Id.
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the guilty (false negatives or Type II errors).91 Later we explain
why the APP does not necessarily increase error in convicting
the innocent: in fact, it even has the potential to reduce such
error.92 It is beyond the scope of this Article, however, to ex-
amine comprehensively the optimal mix of the two types of er-
rors in criminal cases.93 Let us assume that the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard implies a probability of at least .95
that the defendant committed the crime. Under this assump-
tion, the law prefers setting free eighteen-but not nineteen-
guilty people rather than sending one innocent person to jail.
Suppose, now, that a person is accused of four offenses of
similar severity and for each, there is a probability of .9 that he
is guilty. Adhering to the .95 threshold would mandate convict-
ing the defendant for two offenses. 94 If the legal system acquits
a person of all four offenses (as required by the DPP)95 it will in
effect endorse a principle under which it is better to have 9999
guilty people acquitted than a single innocent person convicted.
Aside from its evident absurdity, this outcome highlights the
discriminatory effect of the DPP as opposed to the APP: uphold-
ing the DPP implies an unfair preference for people accused of
committing a series of offenses over people accused of commit-
ting a single offense.96 The requisite probability of guilt neces-
sary to convict a defendant in the former case (the case involv-
ing a series of offenses) is much higher than what is required in
the latter case (the case involving a single offense). 97 A person
who has committed an offense beyond a reasonable doubt will
be set free simply because the particular offense that he com-
mitted could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The
APP requires that the presumption of innocence should apply
in a nondiscriminatory way.
91. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public En-
forcement of Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 403, 427-29 (A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (discussing different ways to
optimize Type I and Type II errors in law enforcement); STEIN, supra note 16,
at 141-71 (discussing the allocation of risks of error in the law of evidence);
I.P.L. Png, Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the Presence of Judicial Error,
6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 101, 102-04 (1986) (discussing different ways to op-
timize Type I and Type II errors in law enforcement).
92. See infra text accompanying note 99.
93. See supra note 91.
94. See supra note 4.
95. See supra Example 1.
96. See id.
97. See id.
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As stated at the outset of this Part, the APP can be ex-
pected to raise the number of erroneous convictions of the inno-
cent. But given certain realistic assumptions concerning the
limited resources allocated to law enforcement, it is possible
that the costs resulting from convicting the innocent would be
lower under the APP than under the DPP. In fact, even the
number of errors resulting from convicting the innocent may be
lower.
Suppose there is a constraint on the total amount of pu-
nishment the state can inflict on offenders, such as the total
number of years all offenders can be sent to prison. Since the
APP is expected to yield more convictions, the state can take
one of two strategies (or a combination thereof): The one strat-
egy would be to shorten the period of time an offender is sent to
prison for conviction on one charge. As a result, offenders who
are convicted of several offenses would, on average, be sen-
tenced to more years in prison, and other offenders-those who
are charged with having committed one offense-would, on av-
erage, be sentenced to fewer years in prison. If the probability
of error in a finding of guilt with respect to offenders who are
convicted of several offenses is lower than with respect to de-
fendants who are charged with having committed one offense
(which is very likely),98 and since the costs of error in convicting
the innocent is also a function of the years the innocent spends
in jail, the shift from the DPP to the APP could decrease the to-
tal costs of convicting the innocent. 99
98. C.Y. Cyrus Chu et al., Punishing Repeat Offenders More Severely, 20
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 127, 136 (2000).
99. Cf. Henrik Lando, The Size of the Sanction Should Depend on the
Weight of the Evidence, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 277, 278 (2005) (suggesting that
sanctions be correlated with the weight of evidence and noting that this would
result in less unfairness to the innocent who are wrongly convicted and less
cost to society); Talia Fisher, Rethinking the Bipolar Structure of the Criminal
Verdict 19-29 (Oct. 13, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1488345 (arguing that sanctions
should be correlated with the probability of guilt and pointing out that, among
other things, adopting such a rule could reduce the costs of convicting the in-
nocent). Our argument is analogous to a different argument made by theorists,
according to which it is justified to punish repeat offenders more severely than
other offenders because the risk of wrongly convicting the innocent is lower
with the former than with the latter. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 228 (7th ed. 2007) (increasing punishment for repeat offend-
ers is justified because the risk of convicting the innocent is lower in their
case); Chu et al., supra note 98, at 135 (arguing that increasing the punish-
ment for repeat offenders and decreasing it for other offenders could achieve
the same level of deterrence and, at the same time, would reduce the risks of
convicting the innocent).
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A second strategy would be to raise the minimum thre-
shold necessary for conviction, for example from .95 to .98.
With this strategy, the state could keep both the number of
convictions and the average time period that an offender is sent
to prison for one offense at its current level under the DPP.
This strategy would arguably decrease the number of errors in
convicting the innocent, since the required probability of guilt
for conviction would be higher under the APP than the DPP.
B. DETERRENCE
The APP is superior to the DPP on deterrence grounds,
particularly for repeat offenders. Under the APP, repeat of-
fenders have a smaller chance of avoiding conviction than un-
der the DPP.100 This implies a higher expected sanction for re-
peat offenders under the APP and, accordingly, greater
deterrence than under the DPP.101
This advantage of the APP is significant if one assumes
that the expected sanction necessary to achieve optimal deter-
rence is in fact higher for repeat offenders than for other of-
fenders. 102 But the APP is even more conducive to deterrence
100. See supra Part II.B.
101. See infra Part IV.B.
102. There are different views on the question as to whether, in order to
achieve optimal deterrence, repeat offenders should be punished more severely
than other offenders. See David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating
Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 737 (2001) (arguing that
declining penalties for repeat offenders are optimal since the probability of de-
tection escalates with offense history); Winand Emons, A Note on the Optimal
Punishment for Repeat Offenders, 23 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 253, 254 (2003)
(arguing that when punishment is a fine, under certain conditions, the optimal
sanction scheme decreases); Winand Emons, Escalating Penalties for Repeat
Offenders, 27 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 170, 171 (2007) (arguing that under cer-
tain conditions, increasing sanctions for repeat offenders is optimal and, under
other conditions, the reverse holds true); Thomas J. Miceli & Catherine Bucci,
A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 1 REV. L. &
ECON. 71, 72 (2005) (claiming that repeat offenders should be punished more
severely than other offenders, because of their diminished employment oppor-
tunities); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, A Model of Optimal
Fines for Repeat Offenders, 46 J. PUB. ECON. 291, 291 (1991) (claiming that
when the penalty is a fine and when the ill-gotten gains of the offenders are
not considered part of the social good, it is optimal to punish repeat offenders
more severely than other offenders in one type of case, less severely in another
type of case, and with the same severity in other types of cases); A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On Offense History and the Theory of Deterrence,
18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 305, 306-07 (1998) (arguing that when the ill-gotten
gains of the offenders are considered part of the social good, it is optimal to
punish repeat offenders more severely than other offenders); Richard A. Posn-
er, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1215
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given that repeat offenders are often "professionals," whereas
one-time offenders are often amateurs. 103 As professionals, re-
peat offenders are likely to be more sophisticated than their
first-time counterparts. Indeed, professional criminals are more
responsive to sanctions and also more inclined to take precau-
tions to reduce the likelihood of conviction.10 4 Consequently, re-
peat offenders, especially the most sophisticated ones, aware of
the operation of the DPP, may seek to organize their criminal
activity in such a way that foils sufficient evidence being
amassed with respect to each distinct crime. Heads of crime or-
ganizations are a good example of such repeat offenders. In-
deed, due to the DPP, many of them are not brought to trial or
ever convicted. They are extremely proficient at playing by the
rules of the game and the DPP facilitates this effort. It is this
class of criminals that will be particularly deterred under the
APP.10
Deterrence considerations would not favor the use of the
APP across different trials in cases characterized by Example
2. In that Example, a defendant is charged with two offenses
and the probability that he committed each offense is .95. In
(1985) ("[A] repeat offender is usually punished more severely than a first of-
fender even if the repeat offender served in full whatever sentences were im-
posed for the earlier crimes . . . ."); Ariel Rubinstein, On an Anomaly of the De-
terrent Effect of Punishment, 6 EcON. LETTERS 89, 90 (1980) (arguing that
punishing repeat offenders more harshly increases deterrence of offenders).
103. See, for example, the "dangerous special offender" statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3575 (1988) (repealed 1984), which provided for an enhanced penalty of up to
twenty-five years imprisonment for repeat offenders, professional criminals,
and organized crime offenders.
104. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions and
Differences in Individuals' Likelihood of Avoiding Detection, 13 IN'L REV. L. &
ECON. 217, 223 (1993) (discussing optimal enforcement when some individuals
are more sophisticated than others).
105. A possible counterargument is that repeat sophisticated offenders may
increase their avoidance efforts under the APP, which would be of greater
benefit to them than under the DPP. Under certain conditions, this would re-
sult in more, rather than less, crime. See Jacob Nussim & Avraham Tabbach,
Deterrence and Avoidance 11-16, 18-24 (Oct. 20, 2005) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=844828 (showing that under cer-
tain conditions, higher sanctions encourage criminals to take more avoidance
measures and reduce their expected sanctions); cf. Chris William Sanchirico,
Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1276
(2001) (arguing that if bad character evidence were admitted at the conviction
stage, the disincentive for engaging in crime would be weakened, since charac-
ter evidence enhances the probability of conviction, both for those who com-
mitted the prescribed acts and for those who refrained from such behavior,
leading to a decrease in the marginal cost of engaging in the criminal activity
ex ante; banning bad character evidence thus promotes deterrence).
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such a case, we suggested that under the APP the person ought
to be convicted in one rather than two offenses as the probabili-
ty he committed both offenses is lower than .95. Yet, if applied
to cases involving different trials, the APP could result in the
absurd outcome that a person who was convicted in the past is
"free" (or, at least freer) to commit a crime with no punishment.
For this and other reasons 106 we do not recommend using the
APP across different trials.
C. COSTS OF ENFORCEMENT
Another advantage of the APP is its cost-effectiveness. This
feature results from the fact that the marginal costs of gather-
ing items of evidence to prove a single specified offense typical-
ly increase. 107 To illustrate, suppose that under the DPP, the
prosecution needs to provide ten items of evidence to meet the
standard of proof for a specific offense X. It is typically much
harder-and more costly-to collect the tenth item of evidence
than the ninth item, the eighth item, and so on.108 Under the
APP, nine items could be more than enough to secure a convic-
tion, so long as the prosecution can provide one or more items
of evidence relating to another offense Y, reasonably attributed
to the defendant.
IV. OBJECTIONS
This Part examines several objections to the APP. These
objections should be taken seriously. Yet, none of them provide
106. See infra Part IV.D.
107. See infra note 108.
108. See, e.g., Talia Fisher, The Boundaries of Plea Bargaining: Negotiating
the Standard of Proof, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943, 950-51 (2007)
("One can posit a situation where the task of proving the final X percent of the
prosecution's case requires a vast investment in resources on its part . . .. The
prosecution may regard this evidence as crucial for proving its case 'beyond a
reasonable doubt'. . . ."); Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, When Good
Value Chains Go Bad: The Economics of Indirect Liability for Copyright In-
fringement, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 961, 970 (2001) ("If it is relatively easy to detect
some infringers, but not others, this pattern may lead to decreasing returns to
scale (i.e., increasing marginal costs of enforcement at a given stage)."); Ehud
Guttel & Alon Harel, Matching Probabilities: The Behavioral Law and Eco-
nomics of Repeated Behavior, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1213 n.54 (2005) (stat-
ing that increasing enforcement can be achieved by either requiring enforcers
to work more or recruiting additional personnel, under either approach "the
marginal cost of enforcement is likely to increase"); Chris William Sanchirico,
Evidence Tampering, 53 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1333 (2004) ('The phenomenon of
increasing marginal costs corresponds to the exhaustion of economies of scale
in enforcement.").
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a sufficient reason to reject the APP. Instead, awareness of the
force of these objections results in certain modifications of our
proposal and in narrowing the scope of the application of the
APP.
This Part ignores, however, one doctrinal constraint. Rule
8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
two offenses may be joined in the same indictment if they "are
of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act
or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a
common scheme or plan."109 Under Rule 14(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts may order separate trials if
the joinder of offenses appears to prejudice a defendant or the
government." 0 Hence, it appears that much of what we propose
is currently precluded by the prevailing procedural rules. We
assume that if our proposal is adopted, some of these rules may
require alteration. Applying the APP would require that differ-
ent offenses which, under Rule 14(a) are currently investigated
in different trials, be joined together.
A. MANIPULATIONS BY THE PROSECUTION AND AGENCY COSTS
Arguably, the use of the APP will invite large-scale
abuse.111 After all, it is relatively easy to bring some evidence
109. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a).
110. Id. 14(a).
111. Prosecutorial misconduct was one of the main concerns expressed by
Justice Brennan in his dissent in Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 363
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court today adds a powerful new wea-
pon to the Government's arsenal. . . . Indeed there is no discernible limit to the
Court's rule; the defendant could be forced to relitigate these facts in trial af-
ter trial."). The risk of prosecutorial misconduct is a consideration in shaping
procedural and evidentiary doctrines. See Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skil-
lern, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative Law for Prosecutorial Decision
Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 476-77 (1976) (noting the lack of controls
over prosecutorial decision making); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race:
The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 20-25 (1998)
(discussing prosecutors' vast discretion and power); Angela J. Davis, The
American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86
IOWA L. REV. 393, 410-15 (2001) (asserting that prosecutorial misconduct oc-
curs at numerous stages of the criminal process-including the pretrial stage
and during trial-and that only on rare occasions is the misconduct discov-
ered); Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators
Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 70 (1995)
("[E]vidence of prosecutorial misconduct, particularly in federal cases, may be
difficult to obtain . . . ."); Lesley E. Williams, The Civil Regulation of Prosecu-
tors, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3441, 3442-47 (1999) (discussing how professional
norms and statutory and constitutional law fail to regulate prosecutorial be-
havior in light of prosecutorial immunity).
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indicating the guilt of any defendant. Consequently, there is a
grave risk that under the APP, any person could be convicted
for some offense without significant evidence supporting the
conviction. The prosecution would find it easy to "tailor"
charges and abuse the criminal process. If a person is accused
of committing a certain offense and the prosecution fails to
prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecutor could
easily collect some evidence suggesting that the defendant
committed a different offense and thus overcome the evidential
hurdles to conviction. It seems therefore that there are serious
institutional reasons to stick with the current procedural sys-
tem governed by the DPP.
This objection is not a reason for rejecting the APP, but ra-
ther for designing it in a way that would alleviate the manipu-
lation concerns. Recall that under the principles of evidence
law, a person cannot be convicted on the basis of statistical evi-
dence alone. 112 The APP does not change the rules precluding
conviction for statistical evidence.113 To convict a person, case-
specific evidence must be brought with respect to each of the
relevant charges. 114 Otherwise, conviction is not possible.
This requirement may not fully alleviate the concern. In
particular, it does not preclude the possibility of collecting low
probability evidence for conviction. To prevent abuse of the sys-
tem, it is possible to adopt "a minimum threshold" for case-
specific evidence. Thus, for example, a standard could be set
whereby only a probability above .5 that the defendant commit-
ted the offenses attributed to him (i.e., the preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard) can be aggregated and used against the
defendant. A minimal threshold of this type would significantly
reduce the risks of abuse, which are particularly heightened
when the threshold required for admitting evidence is low.
A related objection is based on the premise that it is better
to convict a person of a specified offense rather than an unspe-
cified one. Yet, under the APP, prosecutors may fail to act ac-
cordingly and they may prefer conviction for an unspecified of-
fense.
This objection is unpersuasive. At least in terms of efficien-
cy-based considerations, there is no clear reason to prefer con-
viction for a specified offense over a conviction for an unspeci-
fied one. Second, even if it is better to convict a defendant for a
112. See infra Part IV.B.
113. See infra Part IV.B.
114. STEIN, supra note 16, at 154.
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specified offense, there is no reason to assume that prosecu-
tors-who are the public's fiduciaries-will ignore this fact and
will not take it into account when deciding whether to use the
APP in a particular case. Third, if prosecutors are expected to
ignore this consideration, and consequently over-use the APP,
this misuse of prosecutorial discretion could be addressed di-
rectly by the prosecutors' superiors who could issue clear in-
structions as to the APP's appropriate use. Other institutional
solutions to overcome this abuse could be developed as well.
Arguably prosecutors may bring several charges of low
probability against defendants not only to economize enforce-
ment costs, but also to create a heavy and presumably unjust
burden for the defendant to rebut the charges. Again, this con-
cern should be addressed directly by the courts, as is often done
in cases of abuse. 118 For example, courts could reduce sanctions
imposed upon defendants when the prosecution brings charges
that fail to satisfy the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
That would disincentivize the prosecution from bringing
charges of low probabilities in order to impose unjust burdens
on the defendant.
B. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE AND STATISTICAL INFERENCES
Arguably, the APP is based on "statistical evidence," evi-
dence that is often regarded as inadmissible."16 Moreover, es-
tablishing the defendant's guilt under the APP is based on a
probabilistic conception of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt stan-
dard, which, according to some scholars, undermines the trust
of the public in the criminal justice system.117
In discussing the difference between "naked statistical evi-
dence" and "trace-based forms of evidence," a leading theorist of
evidence law writes:
Naked statistical evidence affiliates to the predictive, as opposed to
the trace-based, mode of fact-finding. The predictive mode of fact-
finding is invariably generalized. Fact-finders endorsing this mode of
reasoning assume that regularities observed in the past will repro-
duce themselves in future cases with roughly the same frequency as
in the past. The trace-based mode-under which "proving that a nail
115. Cf. Andrew James McFarland, Note, Lewis v. United States: A Re-
quiem for Aggregation, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 1057, 1077-79 (1997) (discussing
cases in which defendants subjected to multiple charges for petty offenses
were held to be entitled to the additional protections offered by jury trial).
116. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
117. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and
the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1366-67 (1985).
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was struck by a hammer is to examine the head of the nail and there
discover the trace of a hammer blow"-is case-specific and individua-
lized in character (because each trace is unique). Trace evidence,
therefore, can always be tested for its connection to the individual de-
fendant, which is not the case with predictive evidence.11s
Statistical evidence does not focus on the individual defen-
dant; instead, it purports to establish guilt by using generaliza-
tions concerning the group to which the individual defendant
belongs, e.g., his race, religion, or any other indicator correlated
with criminal activity.119 Thus, if statistical evidence is used,
the fact that crimes of a particular type are committed by indi-
viduals of a certain background could be used to support con-
viction. The opposition to the use of naked statistical evidence
is justified on the grounds that statistical inference "cannot be
tested for its connection to the individual defendant."120 An in-
dividual defendant who is charged with fraud or arson simply
because four houses owned by him were destroyed by fire with-
in a relatively short period of time is arguably helpless against
these charges. This evidence is based exclusively on statistical
inferences rather than on case-specific information and there-
fore there is nothing that the individual defendant can do to de-
feat it.121 Even under this framework, one can show that an op-
position to the use of naked statistical evidence does not
preclude the use of the APP.
Opponents of the APP could argue that the APP allows for
inappropriate use of statistical evidence. A defendant convicted
on the basis of the APP faces several charges, each of which
was established with a certain probability.122 Therefore, it is
arguably the case that statistical inference, rather than case-
specific evidence led to the conviction. There is no connection
between the inference leading to conviction and the particular
118. STEIN, supra note 16, at 206-07 (citation and footnotes omitted).
119. See, e.g., Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial
Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountabili-
ty, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1448-58 (2003) (discussing the use of statistical
evidence in evaluating risks related to sexually violent predators).
120. STEIN, supra note 16, at 206-07.
121. Id. at 207. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the pros and
cons of using naked statistical evidence in criminal cases. Cf. Henry M. Hart,
Jr. & John T. McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, in EVIDENCE &
INFERENCE 48, 54 (Daniel Lerner ed., 1958) ("[The law refuses to honor its
own formula when the evidence is coldly 'statistical."'); Nesson, supra note
117, at 1379 (stating that cases based only on probabilistic evidence are un-
likely to reach the jury because "the factfinder cannot reach a conclusion that
the public will accept as a statement about what happened").
122. See supra Part I.
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circumstances of the defendant, since any defendant facing
similar charges would be convicted. Yet, unlike the paradig-
matic case of statistical evidence presented above, the defen-
dant is not helpless against the charges in the APP context
since ultimately the charges rest on case-specific evidence. The
defendant can rebut the charges simply by providing case-
specific evidence concerning each offense-evidence that will
cast doubt on the probabilistic judgments. The APP rule does
not therefore diverge fundamentally in this respect from the
standard DPP rule in which a person is charged with a single
well-specified offense. In both cases there are several separate
items of evidence supporting the charge, each of which is not
sufficient in itself for conviction, but can, in the aggregate, sus-
tain a conviction.
Indeed, a conviction under the APP is typically based on
the accumulation of all case-specific evidence: all the evidence
brought against the defendant with respect to each charge
must be sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed at least one of the crimes. A compari-
son of two cases demonstrates this point. In one case, a certain
amount of evidence is required for conviction under the DPP,
for example, ten pieces of evidence. In the second case, a cer-
tain amount of evidence is required for conviction under the
APP, for example, eight pieces of evidence for one of the of-
fenses and eight pieces of evidence for another offense. There is
no difference in the types of evidence brought in the two cases.
Since opponents of naked statistical evidence are willing to to-
lerate conviction in the former case, they also ought to tolerate
conviction in the latter case.
Another objection to the APP is that the probabilistic con-
ception of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, upon which
the APP rests, weakens public trust in the criminal justice sys-
tem. 123 According to the most prominent advocate of the public
trust argument, "[o]ur criminal justice system seeks to produce
authoritative finality by inducing the general public to defer to
jury verdicts."124 To achieve this goal,
[T]he evidence .. . must do more than establish a statistical probabil-
ity of the defendant's guilt: it must be sufficiently complex to prevent
probabilistic quantification of guilt . ... [Slo long as the evidence pre-
vents specific quantification of the degree of that uncertainty, an out-
123. See Nesson, supra note 117, at 1366-67.
124. Charles Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The
Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1195 (1979).
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side observer has no reasonable choice but to defer to the jury's ver-
dict. 25
The use of the APP does not conflict with these concerns.
There are no grounds for concern that applying the APP would
undermine public trust in the criminal justice system. This is
because the APP would enable jurors and judges to conclude
that it has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that one of
the offenses was committed by a particular defendant, even if it
cannot be established which specific offense was committed.
Explicit probability calculus-which according to this argument
weakens the public trust in the courts-is no more necessary in
applying the APP than in the DPP when several pieces of evi-
dence must be evaluated by the court.
C. INCREASED LITIGATION
Another objection to the APP is the concern that it would
trigger a flood of litigation. This seems to be a natural conse-
quence of the fact that the APP requires courts to consider even
relatively low probability offenses when determining guilt or
innocence. APP opponents may maintain that its use would en-
courage the prosecution to bring as much evidence as it can
reasonably amass with respect to any seemingly criminal beha-
vior. It follows that the APP would generate a significant in-
crease in the complexity of litigation and, accordingly, lead to
an increase in the costs of the criminal law system.
While the APP is undoubtedly likely to trigger more com-
plex litigation, this is a trivial concern. First, as discussed
above, adopting a minimal threshold that precludes courts from
aggregating low probability offenses would mitigate the ex-
pected increase in litigation. Second, if the volume of litigation
becomes too high due to the APP, it would be more sensible to
increase the threshold for conviction (thereby reducing the
amount of litigation) than to reject the APP altogether. 126
Third, although the APP would stimulate more litigation, it is
likely that the litigation costs would decrease. As explained in
Part III, under the APP, the costs of collecting evidence for any
single conviction would be lower on average than under the
DPP.127 A similar rationale applies to litigation: the litigation
costs entailed in increasing the probability of the defendant's
guilt from .9 to .95 (as required under the DPP) can be expected
125. Id. at 1199 (citation omitted).
126. Cf. supra Part III.A.
127. See supra Part III.C.
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to be higher on average than the cost of increasing this proba-
bility from, say, .5 to .55 (as allowed under the APP). Lastly,
the litigation generated by the APP is not frivolous. On the con-
trary, as was shown earlier, this increase in litigation would re-
sult in a correlative increase in justified convictions and better
enforcement of the law.128
D. IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES AND THE MEANING OF A
PROBABILISTIC THRESHOLD
The APP might be difficult to apply in practice as courts
could make mistakes. A major difficulty of the APP is the in-
terdependence of the offenses with which the defendant is
charged. 129 Given the risks of interdependence, the application
of the APP may become too hard for both the courts and jurors.
Furthermore, sometimes the interdependence is hidden.130 In
such circumstances, the APP would be used as though there
were no interdependence, which could excessively boost the
false conviction rate. Lastly, even where interdependence does
not present any problem for applying the APP, aggregating the
probabilities could be too difficult a task for courts and jurors.
The interdependence problem was discussed above and we
established that so long as the doubts differ with respect to
each offense and the pattern-of-behavior doctrines are not ap-
plied, there would be no reason not to apply the APP, regard-
less of the lack or presence of interdependence.13 1 This would
encompass a large range of cases that could easily be handled
by the courts. Moreover, even when the pattern-of-behavior
doctrines are applied, as long as there are different doubts at-
taching to the separate offenses and the respective probabilities
of the defendant's guilt of each offense after the pattern-of-
behavior doctrines have been applied are not interdependent
(as in Example 4),132 there is no reason not to apply the APP.
Judges would have no difficulty deciding whether these condi-
tions have been met in any given case and, accordingly, could
instruct the jury on whether to apply the APP.
The problem of hidden interdependence warrants special
attention. Hidden interdependence precludes application of the
APP. For example, suppose a driver is caught five times for
128. See supra Part III.B.
129. See supra Part II.B.2.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 132-33.
131. See supra Part II.B.2.
132. See supra Example 4.
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speeding by the same police radar, and that radar's average
rate of error is .75. Assume further that the radar's rate of er-
ror is higher in the evenings than in the mornings (because it is
calibrated every night) and that the rate of error is especially
high with brightly colored cars. Imagine that our driver was
caught on five occasions in the evening and his car is brightly
colored. Assuming the court is unaware of the radar's defects,
aggregating the probabilities could create a high risk of false
conviction.
But this risk of hidden interdependence is not a conclusive
reason for rejecting the APP. Rather, courts should be mindful
of this risk and require sufficient evidence to disprove its exis-
tence before applying the APP. Furthermore, given awareness
of the problem of hidden interdependence, courts would be
more likely to recognize the need to diligently obtain informa-
tion concerning cases involving probabilistic interdependence.
Even in the absence of interdependence, applying the APP
presupposes the court's knowledge of the probabilities relating
to each offense, although in fact, courts do not possess such
knowledge.133 To be sure, under the DPP, courts should be able
to judge whether the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard has
been satisfied. A court's determination of whether the standard
has been satisfied has some probabilistic features. 134 But under
the DPP, courts are not required to ascribe accurate probabili-
ties to their findings.135
This objection does not justify rejecting the use of the APP
across different offenses in the same trial. Admittedly a court
using the APP should look also at the complete picture, namely,
all charges against the defendant. But the APP does not re-
quire courts to ascribe precise probabilities to each offense.
Rough terms such as high probability would suffice to justify
the use of the doctrine. The question that the judge or jury
would have to answer is whether given the evidence there is a
very high likelihood that the defendant committed an offense
(rather than a particular offense as required under the DPP). If
the judge (or jury) concludes that such evidence exists, then a
conviction would follow.
133. See STEIN, supra note 16, at 64 ("In real life, evidence is constantly
missing . . .. Fact-finders have to settle for less.").
134. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
135. See STEIN, supra note 16, at 65 (noting that fact-finders are forced to
make probability estimates based on inadequate evidence).
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To understand just what the APP requires of courts, it is
useful to compare its requirements to those under the DPP.
The DPP requires courts to examine whether there is sufficient
evidence that the defendant committed offense A, or sufficient
evidence that he committed offense B, or sufficient evidence
that he committed offense C.136 Only if there is sufficient evi-
dence to establish guilt in one of these offenses is the defendant
convicted of that offense. 137 In contrast, under the APP, the
court must address the additional question of whether there is
sufficient evidence that the defendant committed any one of the
three charged offenses. 138 Thus, using the APP, a court could
conclude that even though it cannot convict the defendant for
committing any specific offense, it can convict him for commit-
ting one indeterminate offense because there is no reasonable
doubt that he committed one offense. This shows that there is
no meaningful difference between how the reasonable doubt
principle is applied under the APP and under the DPP. While
under the DPP, the court convicts the defendant when there is
no reasonable doubt he committed the specific offense attri-
buted to him, under the APP, the court convicts the defendant
when there is no reasonable doubt that he committed at least
one offense among several with which he is charged.
E. REDUNDANCY
Finally, it can be argued that the APP is already used by
courts implicitly,139 and thus there is no need to recognize it
136. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
137. Id.
138. A similar argument to the one discussed here is sometimes raised
against the application of the Hand formula in torts, which, arguably, requires
courts to calculate expected damages and costs of precaution and then com-
pare them with each other in order to determine whether the defendant was
negligent or not. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 32, at 351-52 ("The margin-
al Hand rule states that the injurer is negligent if the marginal cost of his or
her precaution is less than the resulting marginal benefit . . . . To apply the
Hand rule, the decision-maker must know whether a little more precaution
costs more or less than the resulting reduction in expected accident costs.").
However, in order to implement the Hand formula, it is sufficient that the
court determine whether the marginal expected damages are higher or lower
than the marginal costs of precautions, and it need not make any accurate cal-
culation of those figures. See id.; Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 243, 272-73 (2007) (explaining how probabilistic rules can be applied
with rough, rather than accurate, information about probabilities).
139. See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold & Hossein A. Abbasi, The Impact of
Joinder and Severance on Federal Criminal Cases: An Empirical Study, 59
VAND. L. REV. 349, 367 (2006) (showing empirically that criminal defendants
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explicitly. Moreover, if courts are applying it implicitly, forcing
them to apply it explicitly may result in double counting. This
objection to the use of the APP contends that when several
charges are brought against a defendant-even if unrelated to
one another-the judge and the jury are in fact influenced by
the accumulation of charges and tend to convict more readily
than if there were only one charge.140
Obviously, the argument that courts implicitly aggregate
probabilities across offenses is valid only when several offenses
are charged at the same trial. When this is not the case, aggre-
gating probabilities is certainly not done implicitly and should
also not be done explicitly. But the APP is a desirable mechan-
ism that provides a justification for trying several unrelated
charges, even of different natures, against one defendant in the
same trial. 141 Of course, there may be other considerations con-
cerning joining different charges in one trial, which could have
great weight, but the desirability of the APP should also be re-
garded as a relevant factor in making the procedural decision
whether to charge a defendant for different crimes in one trial
or not.142
Is it true that courts implicitly aggregate probabilities
across offenses? It is hard to know whether this is empirically
correct. With respect to judges, it may be possible to assume a
certain commitment on their part to examine each charge sepa-
rately. The prevailing legal ethos founded on the DPP principle
does not allow considerations of the type examined above. 143 To
the extent that judges inculcate this ethos, it follows that they
are likely to consciously reject the very possibility of aggregat-
ing probabilities. But if courts do sometimes apply a rule that
resembles the APP, it is better that this be done explicitly and
systematically, rather than implicitly and randomly. Further-
who face multiple charges in a single trial have a harder time prevailing than
those who face several trials of one count each).
140. Id.
141. The prior-acts and similar-crimes doctrines allow courts and jurors,
under certain conditions, to consider the accumulation of the evidence of all
charges. See supra Part II.B.1. But as we explained previously, these two doc-
trines differ from the APP. Id.
142. See supra Part IV. Interestingly, those who oppose aggregating proba-
bilities across different offenses, both explicitly and implicitly, could make use
of exactly the opposite argument: different charges should not be brought at
the same trial to avoid the risk of aggregation of this type.
143. See Nesson, supra note 124, at 1188 ("[Dlue process requires that the
prosecution in a criminal case prove each and every material element of a
criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .").
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more, the application of the APP can sometimes be complicated
and tricky, and it would be best to contend with this in a
straightforward manner, rather than leaving it to the inconsis-
tent intuition of judges and jurors.
Arguably, even if judges do not apply the APP, it is possible
that the police and prosecution apply some version of it in mak-
ing their decisions regarding law enforcement efforts. Accord-
ing to this theory, when the police and prosecution acquire evi-
dence related to different offenses allegedly committed by the
same person, they are more likely to bring him to trial. As such,
they generally have more information about his potential in-
volvement in perpetrating crimes and they try harder to collect
even more evidence to increase the chances of conviction. 144
This argument is unpersuasive. First, if courts refuse to
apply the APP it will be a factor in prosecutors' decisions not to
charge suspects even if, when aggregating the probabilities,
they are convinced that the defendant is guilty of a specific of-
fense. Prosecutors will know that, as long as they are unable to
establish that the defendant committed a specific offense, the
court will acquit him under the DPP. Second, even if the police
and prosecution do increase their enforcement efforts it is still
not clear why courts should not apply the APP. By refusing to
adopt the APP, courts encourage the prosecution to incur ex-
cessive enforcement costs as such costs under the APP are low-
er than under the DPP.145
Finally, it could be argued that, at least in plea bargains,
the APP is already applied in practice. When there are several
accusations against a defendant (even when none of them
meets the threshold necessary for conviction) the mere cumula-
tive force of the different allegations influences the nature of
the deal made between the prosecution and defendant. Even
assuming this argument is correct, courts should apply the
APP. As described above, prosecutors act in the shadow of the
prospective trial.146 Therefore, if the APP is not applied by
144. Dana, supra note 102, at 742-43 ("The question whether probabilities
of detection escalate is ultimately an empirical matter, but not a matter easily
subject to study. Because offenders are reluctant to provide candid information
regarding their undetected violations, researchers face huge obstacles in de-
veloping any comparative assessments of the success of different groups of of-
fenders in evading detection.").
145. See supra Part III.C.
146. See Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2295, 2325 (2006) (noting that prosecutors incorporate rules which ex-
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courts, this will most certainly affect the shape of plea bar-
gains. Defendants would not accept deals when the trial (go-
verned now by the DPP) is unlikely to result in conviction. Fur-
thermore, even if the APP is perfectly applied in the context of
plea bargains, there is still no reason why the APP should not
be applied by courts as well.
V. RETRIBUTIVIST AND EXPRESSIVIST THEORIES OF
PUNISHMENT
A. THE CASE AGAINST AGGREGATION OF PROBABILITIES
Thus far, we argued that deterrence-based theories, par-
ticularly theories that focus on efficiency, would likely endorse
a moderate version of the APP. It is time to consider the justi-
fiability of the APP and DPP from the perspective of justice-
based theories. Different justice-based theories of punishment
are likely to endorse different views of the APP. Some justice-
based theories, in particular some versions of retributivist
theories, would be inclined to accept the APP, while others, in
particular expressivist theories, would tend to reject it.
Let us proceed with retributivist theories. Kant maintained
that "[p]unishment by a court ... can never be inflicted merely
as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself
or for civil society. It must always be inflicted upon him only
because he has committed a crime."147 This observation lies at
the foundation of many retributivist theories.148 David Dolinko
conceives of retributivists as those who justify punishment "by
appealing to the notion that criminals deserve punishment ra-
ther than to the consequentialist claim that punishing offend-
ers yields better results than not punishing them."149 Under
what Dolinko labels "bold retributivis[m]," "lawbreakers de-
serve punishment and that this, all by itself, constitutes a good
or sufficient reason for the state to inflict punishment on
clude reliable evidence in the plea bargaining stage because the bargaining
"takes place in the shadow of the trial").
147. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 105 (Mary Gregor
ed., Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge University Press 1996) (1797).
148. We do not argue, however, that Kant was committed to the versions of
retributivism that we present below. Kant's theory of punishment has been
interpreted by many theorists, and we do not purport to provide an interpreta-
tion of it here.
149. David Dolinko, Some Thoughts About Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537,
541-42 (1991).
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them." 50 Dolinko also asserts that retributivists believe in pro-
portionality, namely, that wrongdoers ought to be made to suf-
fer in proportion to their offenses.15
Criminals, according to this view, simply deserve to be pu-
nished, and this desert provides the justification for inflicting
punishment on them.152 Hence, under this version of retributiv-
ism, if it is shown that an agent committed a wrong there is a
reason to impose a sanction on that person, even if the nature
of the wrong remains unspecified. It should be noted that there
is no consensus as to what retributivism really is,153 but for the
purposes of the discussion in this Part, we focus on Dolinko's
version. Different characterizations of retributivism are unlike-
ly to lead to a different result.
In contrast, expressivists underscore the importance of the
expressive, educational, and communicative aspects of criminal
sanctions. 5 4 Under expressivist theories, sanctioning a wrong-
doer is a public manifestation of condemnation and disapproba-
tion of his deeds. 55 Some believe that the need for condemna-
tion is in itself a sufficient justification for the infliction of
criminal sanction, whereas others hold that it is conducive to
other goals, such as education or the inducement of a sense of
guilt.156
Robert Nozick falls into the former camp. He argues that
"[r]etributive punishment is an act of communicative beha-
vior." 5 7 In elaborating on the concept of communicative beha-
vior, Nozick speaks of retributive principles as encompassing
two goals. The first is to "connect the wrongdoer to value qua
value," and the second is to connect the wrongdoer in a way
150. Id. at 542.
151. Id. at 550 (discussing Jean Hampton's characterization of retributiv-
ism in her essay The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 125-26
(1988)); cf. Thomas E. Hill, Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment, 18
LAW & PHIL. 407, 409 (1999) (illustrating retributivists' use of proportionality
in sentencing).
152. Hill, supra note 151, at 425.
153. See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of
"Just" Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 845 n.1 (2002) ("[A] precise defini-
tion of retributivism has proven elusive. . . .").
154. See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in
DOING AND DESERVING 95, 98 (1970); Jean Hampton, The Moral Education
Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208, 212 (1984).
156. See Dolinko, supra note 149, at 541-42 (comparing justifications for
punishment).
157. ROBERT NozICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 370 (1981).
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"that value qua value has a significant effect in [the criminal's]
life, as significant as his own flouting of correct values."15 8 Oth-
er eminent expressivist theorists of punishment defend related
justifications. Joel Feinberg asserts that "punishment is a con-
ventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment
and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reproba-
tion, on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of
those 'in whose name' the punishment is inflicted." 159 Jean
Hampton shifts the focus to educational concerns. In her view,
"punishment is intended as a way of teaching the wrongdoer
that the action she did (or wants to do) is forbidden because it
is morally wrong and should not be done for that reason."160 All
of these theorists justify punishment in expressivist terms-as
a means of conveying and expressing condemnation.
Although expressivist theories would not necessarily reject
the APP, they would seem likely to have reservations with re-
spect to its applicability. After all, these theories highlight the
condemnation or disapproval of an act. Arguably, it is a prere-
quisite for conveying condemnation and disapproval of an act to
identify clearly the object of condemnation and disapproval, i.e.,
to identify unambiguously the condemned act. 16 1 Punishing a
person for an offense that person may or may not have commit-
ted rather than for the offense that person actually committed
dilutes the important expressive, educational, and communica-
tive messages of punishment. Hence, expressivist theories
would likely reject the APP because, under it, no specific act
can be attributed to the individual being punished and, conse-
quently, no act can be effectively condemned. To condemn a
person for an act that he may not have committed simply be-
cause the act is part of a disjunction of acts diverges signifi-
cantly from condemning a specific act. Only condemning a per-
son for a specific act can meet expressivist concerns.
The rejection of the APP by expressivist theorists is no ac-
cident. It is a by-product of the way these theorists address
what seems to be one of their apparent weaknesses. Expressiv-
158. Id. at 376-77.
159. Feinberg, supra note 155, at 98.
160. Hampton, supra note 155, at 212.
161. It is possible, of course, to develop an expressivist theory that focuses
on the condemnation of the character of the actor or his culpability rather
than condemnation of the acts he has performed. This is not the route taken
by traditional expressivist theories of punishment. See, e.g., id. at 225 (dis-
cussing that punishment should educate someone that a particular act is
wrong and not concern itself with their character or moral duties).
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ist theories are vulnerable to the accusation that condemning
theft, rape, or murder does not necessitate the infliction of
sanctions on the perpetrator.162 After all, these acts can be ef-
fectively condemned without any resort to punishment. To ad-
dress this objection, expressivist theories claim punishment to
be a special mode of expression.163 The distinct nature of pu-
nishment as an expressive practice requires that the object of
condemnation be specific and concrete.164 Punishment must,
therefore, be designed to express disapproval of a particular act
that was performed by the perpetrator, not for an act that may
or may not have been committed by him. Evidence of this re-
quirement for specificity is abundant in expressivist theories.165
According to Hampton, for instance, the punisher needs "to
communicate to the wrongdoer that her victims suffered . .. so
that the wrongdoer can appreciate the harmfulness of her ac-
tion."166 Feinberg also maintains that "punishment surely ex-
presses the community's strong disapproval of what the crimi-
nal did."167 Communicating disapproval by punishing an
individual for a disjunction of acts, e.g., stealing or committing
fraud, does not satisfy the specificity of expressive condemna-
tion required by these theories.
Proponents of the APP could counter the expressivist ar-
guments by advocating that by endorsing the APP, punishment
conveys disapproval of all offenses comprising the disjunction.
Arguably, a conviction based on the APP can reflect disapprov-
al and condemnation of all offenses included in the disjunction.
Thus, ironically, it seems that the APP is an even more effec-
tive means of expressing disapproval than the DPP. It conveys
the message that all the offenses included in the disjunction
warrant condemnation.
This contention, however, fails to appreciate the subtlety of
the concerns raised by expressivist theories. It does not capture
the significance of the condemnation of a concrete act-the pre-
162. See, e.g., id. (acknowledging that punishment is only one form of moral
education).
163. See Feinberg, supra note 155, at 98-99, 263; Hampton, supra note
155, at 225.
164. Hampton, supra note 155, at 216 ("[Olur principal concern as we pu-
nish is to get the wrongdoer to stop doing the immoral action by communicat-
ing to her that her offense was immoral.").
165. See, e.g., id. at 225 (discussing how punishment should focus on edu-
cating that a specific act is wrong).
166. Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
167. Feinberg, supra note 155, at 100.
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cise act that has been perpetrated by the criminal. Concrete
condemnation stresses the hideousness of an actual act per-
formed by the defendant: murder, rape, theft, or fraud rather
than merely a crime deserving a sentence of at least ten years
such as murder or rape or theft or fraud.
Another reason why expressivist concerns may lead to re-
jection of the APP is the well-being of crime victims. Victims of-
ten wish for the criminal who perpetrated the crime against
them to be punished for that crime. But an implication of the
APP is that the criminal may not be convicted of any specific
crime and, consequently, no victim of a particular crime can
conclusively establish that a wrong has been committed against
him.
In summary, different justice-based theories take different
stances with regard to the APP. Whereas at least some retribu-
tivist theories are likely to be sympathetic to the APP, expres-
sivist theories are likely to be more wary of it. Perhaps this ex-
plains the intuitive reluctance on the part of criminal law
theorists and practitioners to implement the APP in practice.
B. THE CASE FOR A MODERATE AGGREGATE PROBABILITIES
PRINCIPLE
When, if ever, should courts recognize and employ the
APP? For retributivists (at least those advocating the type of
retributivism described above), the answer would be that the
APP should be applied without limit. For expressivists, it de-
pends on whether using the APP will effectively serve the ex-
pressive, educational, and communicative functions of criminal
law. It seems that the more similar two offenses are, the more
likely that applying the APP will not undercut the expressive,
educational, and communicative functions attributed by ex-
pressivists to criminal law. In contrast, the greater the hetero-
geneity of the offenses, the more these theorists would wish to
apply the DPP. Similarity and difference are, of course, com-
plex and multifaceted concepts. It is not always a simple feat to
determine what makes two -offenses similar or different in the
relevant sense.
One parameter is the nature of the offense. To understand
the relevance of the nature of the offense, assume that it can be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a person committed an
act of either murder or theft but it cannot be established that
he committed any one of them. The fact that the offenses are so
different, and that one is classified a bodily offense whereas the
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other is classified as a property offense, seems sufficient to ar-
rive at the conclusion that this person ought not to be con-
victed. Some criminal law theorists acknowledge this concern
as "fair labeling."168 This is the concern that "offenders . . . be
labeled with an adequate degree of precision, in order that the
criminal record identifies the gist of . . [the offender's] criminal
wrongdoing."169
But even in cases in which a person is charged with two of-
fenses of the same type, e.g., two instances of fraud, it seems
implausible under expressivist theories to convict that person
of an unspecified offense. If the prosecution can prove that the
defendant committed either fraud on one occasion or an unre-
lated act of fraud on another occasion, he should most likely be
acquitted. This example illustrates the relevance of a second
important dimension of expressivist theories: the homogeneity
of the different instances of the same offense. In the present
example, the two offenses are classified as fraud offenses; the
very same criminal law provisions would be applied against the
perpetrators of these offenses. But, despite this formal similari-
ty, no two fraud offenses are identical in severity. The nature
and severity of any concrete fraud offense are always colored by
the particular circumstances of the case at hand: the sum of
money involved, the identity of the victim, etc. Heterogeneity
makes it more difficult to express concrete condemnation of the
act performed by the defendant since the disjunction of the of-
fenses consists of very different acts.
Yet, there are circumstances under which the heterogen-
eity of the situations should not bar an unspecified conviction
under expressivist theories. Assume that two bank officers
have committed a series of unrelated frauds against a single
bank during the same time period. It can be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that one officer committed a series of frauds
against the bank and stole $100,000, while the other officer
committed a series of frauds against the bank and stole
$200,000. It cannot, however, be established who committed
which series of frauds. It seems in such a case that the similari-
ty in circumstances is sufficient to make the condemnation of
both offenders specific enough and to convey a clear and con-
crete disapproval of the behavior in question.
168. See, e.g., A. P. Simester & G. R. Sullivan, On the Nature and Rationale
of Property Offences, in DEFINING CRIMES 168, 186-87 (R. A. Duff & Stuart P.
Green eds., 2005).
169. Id.
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Another parameter that seems to bear on this case is the
identity of the victim of the offense. If it can be established that
several offenses were committed against one particular victim,
and that the circumstances under which the offenses were
committed were identical, then expressivist theories could en-
dorse the use of the APP even if it is not possible to establish
which exact offense the defendant committed.
Our investigation of justice-based theories is inconclusive.
On the one hand, it seems that retributivist theories (of the
type discussed above) would favor the APP, whereas expressiv-
ist theories would be reluctant to accept it.170 Yet, even the lat-
ter need not reject the APP outright. The more similar the
crimes composing the disjunction are, the less reluctant expres-
sivist theories should be to endorse the APP. The inconclusive-
ness of this Part is not coincidental. It reflects genuine conflict-
ing sentiments characterizing the nature of criminal law. The
reluctance of the legal system to endorse the APP suggests that
expressivist concerns play an important role in this field.
CONCLUSION
This Article investigated a puzzle: why has the APP been
unequivocally and universally rejected in criminal law? It is
our claim that the reason is probably rooted in expressivist
theories of punishment. These theories affirm that the act for
which a person is condemned needs to be identified so that the
disapproval is sufficiently concrete. This concern can explain
the greater appeal of the APP in contexts where deterrence
seems to be the primary objective, such as regulatory offenses.
If we put aside expressivist concerns, the APP should be
adopted by the legal system. But even then, practicalities
would remain that would limit the scope of the APP's applica-
tion. An appropriately modified version of the APP, which takes
into account the objections discussed in this Article, would
promote deterrence, minimize adjudication errors, and save en-
forcement costs. Given such modifications, the APP could be in-
sulated from abuse and tailored to be consistent with justice-
based theories of punishment, including expressivist theories.
We therefore suggest that the APP be applied, albeit with
great caution and awareness of the difficulties it can generate.
First, the APP should be applied only to charges brought in the
same trial. Implementing the APP across trials could be diffi-
170. See supra Part V.A.
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cult for courts and could also amount to double jeopardy. In ad-
dition, if the APP is adopted, the current rules of criminal pro-
cedure should be changed to allow joinder of unrelated offenses
in the same trial.171 Second, the APP should be applied primari-
ly to regulatory offenses or homogeneous offenses in order to
satisfy expressivist concerns. We do suggest, however, consider-
ing broader application of the APP, especially in contexts where
the risk of repeat offenders escaping punishment under the
DPP is high.172 Third, in applying the APP, courts should pay
particular attention to the interdependence problem.173 Such
sensitivity would be especially imperative when the pattern-of-
behavior doctrines are applied by the court. Fourth, the APP
should be applied only in those cases where the probability of
the defendant's guilt is higher than .5.174 This restriction would
reduce the risk of abuse by the prosecution and at the same
time would provide courts with a familiar standard of proof in
which they are well-trained.
This Article is ultimately the by-product of an enigma. It is
rooted in an observation that the practice of law seems to reject
out of hand and categorically what simple and commonsense
reason seems to emphatically endorse. While in general the
practice of law is wiser than theorists tend to imagine, it may
at times be prone to error in judgment. A rejection of the APP is
one such rare case.
171. See supra Part IV.
172. See supra Part III.B.
173. See supra Part II.B.
174. See supra Part IV.A.
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